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PRIVILEGED VIOLENCE, PRINCIPLED
FANTASY, AND FEMINIST METHOD: THE
COLBY FRATERNITY CASE
Martha T. McCluskey*
Rui Barbosa believes in the law, and bases his belief on erudite
quotations from imperial Romans and English liberals. But he
doesn't believe in reality. The doctor shows a certain realism only
when, at the end of the month, he collects his salary as lawyer for
Light and Power, that foreign enterprise which in Brazil exercises
more power than God.
-Eduardo Galeanol
It is this unconscious restructuring of burdens of proof into bur-
dens of white over black that permits people who say and who be-
lieve that they are not racist to condone and commit crimes of
genocidal magnitude.
-Patricia J. Williams2
Talking to my wife and mother and sisters about the [Clarence
Thomas] hearings, I heard in their voices not so much anger as
resignation and familiarity. "This comes to you as a surprise?"
they said, in so many words. . . . I owe them an apology. They had
experienced things that I had not, and had tried to tell me truths
that I had chosen not to hear.
-The New Yorker'
I. AN EXPERIENCE
It is 1977 at Colby College.4 I'm a student living on Third Floor
Dana. Most of the guys on our hall are pledging Lambda Chi and
KDR,5 rumored to be the worst fraternities on campus-and the
* Counsel, Office of the Public Advocate, State of Maine. B.A., Colby College, 1980;
J.D., Yale Law School, 1988. I thank the many Colby students, faculty, and staff who
have inspired me over the years with their commitment to critical, caring debate. I
am particularly grateful to Kimberly A. Hokanson for generously sharing her exten-
sive research with me, and to the many others who offered ideas, comments, and
research assistance. The views expressed in this article are solely my own.
1. EDUARDO GALEANO, MEMORY OF FiR& Il. CENTURY OF THE WIND 21 (Cedric Bel-
frage, trans., 1988).
2. PATRICIA J WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 68 (1991).
3. Talk of the Town, THE NEW YORKER, OcL 28, 1991, at 33.
4. Located in Waterville, Maine, Colby ranked 20th out of 140 selective liberal
arts colleges in the 1991 U.S. News & World Report's "America's Best Colleges" edi-
tion. U.S. News Top 25 National Liberal Arts Colleges, US NEws & WoRLD REPORT,
Sept. 30, 1991, at 97.
5. Lambda Chi Alpha and Kappa Delta Rho (KDR) are the names of Greek-letter
men's organizations with chapters at colleges nationwide. Members of Lambda Chi.
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most prestigious.
It's the beginning of a vacation and my dorm is quiet and nearly
empty. I am standing in the hallway looking out the window for my
ride home. I turn around and my suitcase is gone; Joe and Bill0 from
down the hall are laughing as they carry it away. I follow them. I
hear a door lock behind me. They let go of my suitcase and grab me.
I am lying on the bare linoleum floor of Joe's bedroom. In the
room are a group of Lambda Chi and KDR pledges who live on my
hall; several of them are football players. Some are sitting on the
bed, laughing. Two others are pinning my arms and my legs to the
floor. Joe is touching me while the others cheer.
I am a friendly fellow-classmate as I reasonably explain that I'm
in a rush to catch a ride; that I'm not in the mood to joke around;
that I'd really like them to please cut it out. It takes a few long
upside-down seconds before things look different. As I start to
scream and fight I feel like I am shattering a world that will not get
put back together. They let me go.
Later I don't talk about this, not even to myself. I sit near Joe and
Bill in sociology and English classes. I don't talk in class.
What is most noteworthy to me about this story is that I don't
remember thinking that this was a noteworthy experience. Being as-
saulted by otherwise normal white college men was not significant in
my life then because I did not understand this as real violence.
II. A METHOD7
If it hurts a woman, it's a big deal.
-Catharine A. MacKinnon8
Feminist jurisprudence aims to change law and life by taking
women seriously.' Feminist method starts by believing women's ac-
counts of our experiences, particularly our experiences of oppres-
sion.1" This feminist legal analysis is part of a growing body of legal
or LCA, were also known at Colby as "Choppers."
6. Names have been changed.
7. The term "method" has scientific connotations that may perpetuate the ideol-
ogy of objectivity that feminist method seeks to unravel. See Carol Smart, Feminist
Jurisprudence, DANGEROUS SUPPLEMENTS 133, 145 (P. Fitzpatrick ed., 1991). None-
theless, I hope that using this term will subversively focus attention on feminism's
challenge not just to the content of law, but to its epistemological foundations.
8. Catharine A. MacKinnon, To Quash a Lie, SMITH ALUMNAE Q., Summer 1991,
11 at 14.
9. "Feminist method starts with the very radical act of taking women seriously,
believing that what we say about ourselves and our experience is important and valid
.... Christine A. Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method
Makes, 41 STAN. L. REV. 751, 764 (1989) (reviewing CATHARINE A MAcKINNON, FEMI-
NISM UNMODIFIED (1987)).
10. "The reason, MacKinnon asserts, that feminism has been able to uncover real-
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scholarship devoted to speaking stories that traditionally have been
silent in most of the U.S. legal system."
It is precisely the apparent innocuousness of this feminist
method-assuming women's experiences are real-that makes it so
radical. To elevate this assumption to a methodology for what may
be a leading approach to law" is to presume that the denial of
women's experiences is fundamental to traditional legal theory.
The legal and societal lie that this feminist method challenges is
not simply a partial truth to which women's experiences can be
added to complete a vision of justice.1 3 In this feminist analysis, the
problem of inequality is not merely a matter of accidental process
failure in need of correction; nor is it a matter of irrational classifi-
cation in need of clarification." Instead, this method is radical be-
cause it examines and resists the dominant process of legal construc-
tion of truth and justice.
Feminist method seriously considers that brutality and injustice
can be the norm in communities full of people who believe they are
well-meaning, respectable, and fair." The predominance of denial of
ity previously hidden from social view is 'its methodological secret. . . that feminism
is built on believing women's accounts of sexual use and abuse by men.'" Id.
11. See, e.g., AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY, (Martha
Albertson Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen eds., 1991); SUSAN 'rcM REAL
RAPE (1987); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and
Teaching: Finding the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 V& L REv 539 (1991); Richard
Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?. 76 VA L REV 95
(1990); Mark Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?.: Story-Telling. Gen-
der-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protections for Lesbians and Gay Alen, 46 U MIAMI1
L. REV. (forthcoming 1992); Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Low
The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L REV
886 (1989); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431; Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience
and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U
CHI. LEGAL F. 23; Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech Considering
the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV 2320 (1989); Cathy Scarborough, Conceptualiz-
ing Black Women's Employment Experiences, 98 YALE LJ 1457 (1989); WILLIAtS
supra note 2.
12. "'Over the next quarter century,' Prof. Laurence H. Tribe of Harvard Law
School says, 'feminist legal theory is likely to be the most fertile source of important
insights in the law.'" Fred Strebeigh, Defining Lau, on the Feminist Frontier, NY
TIMms, Oct. 6, 1991, § 6 (Magazine), 28, 30.
13. See Carol Smart, Law's Power, the Sexed Body, and Feminist Discourse. 17 J
LAW & Soc'v 194, 198-200 (1990).
14. For discussions of traditional views of inequality, see, for example, Paul Brest.
Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV L REv 1, 6-8
(1976); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laus, 37
CALIF. L. REV. 341, 353-56 (1949); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTrusT A TE-
ORv OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 145-70 (1980).
15. Strong reactions to Thelma & Louise, a recent movie version of this theme,
demonstrate that this feminist method is still widely considered radical:
Hysterics were especially in evidence among male critics.
John Robinson of the Boston Globe called T & L "the last straw" of
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oppression is precisely what gives this denial the appearance of rea-
sonableness.'" The "'no-problem' problem," as Deborah Rhode
terms it, overwhelmingly subverts gender justice. 17
Yet this feminist method must negotiate the same dangers of de-
nial it seeks to challenge. Women have no universal, essential "expe-
rience"; accounts of "women's experience" risk neglecting the point
of view of all but the most privileged white women.' 8 The category
"women" is itself an abstraction that excludes the full reality of the
complex and varying experiences of identities (or nonidentities) that
intersect in any particular person.19 Women experience discrimina-
tion not "as women" in the abstract but as "women" of a particular
race, age, class, sexuality, nationality, physical ability, and other
identifying characteristics.20 Each individual woman's accounts of
"male bashing," and "the latest in a string of cultural strikes against man-
hood." . . . John Leo, of U.S. News & World Report, labeled the film
"Toxic Feminism." Ralph Novak of People had even more of a fit: "Any
movie that went as far out of its way to trash women as this female chau-
vinist sow of a film does to trash men would be universally, and justifiably,
condemned."
Dream on, Ralph! Negative stereotyping of women is, indeed, the ac-
cepted norm in Hollywood films ....
But, to be fair, the boys had a right to feel threatened by this movie
Thelma & Louise portrayed male violence as an ordinary, everyday
event.
Kathy Maio, Film: Women Who Murder for the Man, Ms., Nov./Dec. 1991, at 82-83.
16. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State:
Toward Feminist Jurisprudence 8 SIGNS- J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'Y 635, 654
(1983).
17. Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and
Cultural Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731 (1991). "For feminists, a central problem re-
mains the lack of social consensus that there is in fact a problem." Id. at 1734. This
culture of denial is a familiar and deadly feature of systematic racism. See, e g., ANNE
FRANK FOUNDATION, ANTISEMITISM: A HISTORY PORTRAYED (Janrense Boonstra et al.
eds., 1989) 112-16; TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN TIlE KING
YEARS 1954-63 508-09 (1988) (FBI report of beating of black civil rights activist failed
to mention his serious injuries).
18. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN L. REV. 581, 587-88 (1990); Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and
Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUc. 47, 47-48 (1988).
19. Judith Butler cautions against taking "the category of women to be founda-
tional . . . without realizing that the category effects a political closure on the kinds
of experiences articulable as part of feminist discourse." Judith Butler, Gender
Trouble, Feminist Theory, and Psychoanalytic Discourse, FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM
324, 325 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990). Angela Harris argues that the concept of
unified self denies the experiences of women of color. Harris, supra note 18, at 608.
20. Antidiscrimination law frequently enforces the incorrect white-centered view
that discrimination based on sex is separate and independent from discrimination
based on race. See Kimberle Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique of Antidis-
crimination Law and Politics, THE POLITICS OF LAW A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 195
(David Kairys ed., 2d ed. 1990); Scarborough, supra note 11.
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her own experience are filtered through her changing cultural, politi-
cal, and biological contexts. And feminist method ironically draws
on the "regulatory fiction" of gender coherence which, as Judith
Butler argues, is a condition of the gender oppression feminist
method aims to resist.2
1
The denial of gendered oppression, then, operates in different
forms and degrees against different women-and those perceived to
be like women-and operates interdependently with ideologies of
race, sexuality, and class. Feminist legal analysis should emphasize
women's experiences not as windows to a universal or unmediated
reality, but as vehicles to understanding how law credits certain ex-
periences of reality and denies others.
Rhode contends that "[t]he law provides a crucial structure in
which ideologies of denial are reflected and renegotiated. '22 By insti-
tutionalizing and re-enforcing versions of reality that reflect the in-
terests of dominant groups, and by presenting these versions of real-
ity a~s not made but given, law encourages people who are firmly
committed to principles of freedom and equality to "condone and
commit crimes of genocidal magnitude," in Patricia Williams's
words.23 Feminist legal analysis hopes to contest not simply particu-
lar laws but also the agents and terms of legal reality-making-and
to change reality. Feminist method can help demonstrate that jus-
tice requires dismantling a process of systematic denial, not simply
establishing new rules or presenting new facts. And it cautions that
in the face of this denial, traditional legal approaches to civil rights
will bring limited success.
III. A CivirL RIGHTS CASE
A. The Maine Civil Rights Act
In 1989 a group of Maine activists and attorneys concerned about
hate crime drafted what became the Maine Civil Rights Act.2' This
new law was inspired by Klan threats directed at black residents of
a public housing project and by street attacks on gay men.25 The
21. Butler, supra note 19, at 339.
22. Rhode, supra note 17, at 1736.
23. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 68.
24. Ma. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 §§ 4681-4683 (West Supp. 1990-1991). amended by
P.L. 1992, ch. 821.
25. See e.g., The Maine Civil Rights Act: Hearing on L.D. 1253 Before the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 114th Legis., 1st Sess., May 12, 1989 (statement of Donald
F. Fontaine, Esq.); Brief of Amicus Curiae, National Lawyers Guild Maine Chapter at
4 n.2, Phelps v. President and Trustees of Colby College, 595 A.2d 403 (Me. 1991).
See also Talbot Says KKK 'Scary', PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Sept. 14, 1988. at 31;
Imperial Wizard Seeking to Unite Right-Wing Groups, ME SUNDAY TEL .RIA, Oct.
9, 1988, at 43A; Assault Victim Asks Probe of Police, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Nov.
17, 1988, at 39; Two Fined Who Wore Klan Garb at Protest, PORTLAND PRESS HER-
ALD, Jan. 13, 1989, at 9; 'Skinheads' Bolster Ranks of Neo-Nazi Racist Groups, PORT-
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drafters intended the law to provide civil remedies for violations of
civil rights by private persons using threat, intimidation, or
coercion.
2 6
The law states:
Whenever any person, whether or not acting under color of law,
intentionally interferes by threat, intimidation or coercion or at-
tempts to intentionally interfere by threat, intimidation or coer-
cion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any other person of rights
secured by the United States Constitution or the laws of the
United States or of rights secured by the Constitution of Maine or
laws of the State, the Attorney General may bring a civil action for
injunctive or other appropriate equitable relief in order to protect
the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the rights secured.2 7
An additional section of the Act gives private individuals the right
to bring an action in their own name if they are a person "whose
exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the United States Consti-
tution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the Con-
stitution of Maine or laws of the State of Maine, has been interfered
w ith . . .. s28
This is a typical solution to problems of injustice: improving legal
rules-in this instance, by creating a remedy for hate group violence
and threats. But, not atypically, the test case under this new law has
been a suit on behalf of an elite men's group with a history of hate.20
In 1990 the Maine Civil Liberties Union invoked the new Maine
Civil Rights Act to protect the rights of male Colby College students
to participate in a fraternity called Lambda Chi Alpha.30
LAND PRESS HERALD, Mar. 17, 1989, at 2.
26. See supra note 24. The law was patterned after a similar Massachusetts law,
the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, with an additional requirement that the interfer-
ence be intentional. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. tit. 12, § 11H (West 1986).
27. ME REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4681 (West Supp. 1990-1991), amended by P.L.
1992, ch. 821.
28. ME. REV STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4682 (West Supp. 1990-1991), amended by P.L.
1992, ch. 821.
29. Legal provisions designed to protect people of color or all women typically
have been used to advance the interests of those who are white and/or male. See, e.g.,
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
30. The Maine Civil Liberties Union brought a motion for a temporary restraining
order against Colby College on behalf of graduating seniors who were sanctioned by
the college for associating in Lambda Chi Alpha. See Memorandum of Law in Sup-
port of Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Cumb. Cty. Super. Ct.,
May 22, 1990); Frat Action May Violate Civil Rights, ME. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1990, at 7.
After losing the TRO motion, the MCLU continued its suit for an injunction. MCLU
Claims Colby Trampled Rights of Underground Fraternity Students, CENTRAL ME
MORNING SENTINEL, Aug. 9, 1990, at 2.
Prior to the Colby case, Maine's highest court, in the only decision involving the
Maine Civil Rights Act, rejected without discussion a claim by a father against his
child's guardian ad litem. The father claimed that the guardian interfered with his
[Vol. 44:261
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B. The Colby Fraternity Case
Colby College banned fraternities and sororities in 1984 after
many years of unsuccessfully attempting to improve fraternity be-
havior.31 Sexual harassment and sex discrimination were major rea-
sons for the college's decision.2 At first the college withheld official
recognition of and financial benefits to the fraternities.3 3 Member-
ship in fraternities was not punished, although Colby established a
rights by making a recommendation that resulted in the child's custody being given
to the child's mother. Gerber v. Peters, 584 A.2d 605 (Me. 1990).
In contrast to Maine's experience, Massachusetts' similar Civil Rights Act has been
used since 1979 to protect the civil rights of a wide range of plaintiffs. See Jennifer
Wriggins, former Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, Mass. Attorney
General's Office, Introduction to the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (1989) (on file
with author).
31. REPORT OF TRUSTEE COMMISSION ON CAMPUS LIFE. COLBY COLLEGE (Dec. 1983)
(written by Colby Trustee Judge Levin H. Campbell, then Chief Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit) [hereinafter TRUSTEE REPORT]. "'After a
thorough appraisal of the Colby fraternity system, we recommend, sadly, but with
great conviction, that Colby withdraw recognition from its fraternities and sororities."
Id. at 3. See also, Susan Leonard, Colby to Scrap Frats, Sororities, CENTRAL. ME
MORNING SENTINEL, Jan. 16, 1984, at 1, 13 (featuring a picture of male Colby students
feeding fraternity house furniture into a bonfire to protest the trustees' decision).
This decision made Colby the first college in over twenty years to abolish Greek orga-
nizations. Kimberly A. Hokanson, Underground Fraternities at Colby College, May
11, 1989, at 21 (unpublished paper prepared as part of Ph.D. program at Harvard
University Graduate School of Education).
The TRUSTEE REPORT dates fraternities at Colby from 1845, and states that at their
peak "nearly 90 percent of undergraduate men belonged to nine fraternities at Colby,
and received the benefits of camaraderie, independence, and competition which these
institutions bestowed." TRUSTEE REPORT at 6. When the college decided to move to
its present location in the 1930s, it took on the responsibility for financing and con-
structing new fraternity buildings at the center of campus (called "'frat row")--in con-
trast to many colleges, where fraternities are more discreetly located off campus. See
Alpha Rho Zeta of Lambda Chi Alpha, Inc. v. City of Waterville, 477 A.2d 1131, 1135
(Me. 1984). Through the 1970s, the college continued to spend money to bail out the
frequently financially troubled, exclusively male groups. Id. At the time they were
banned, Colby's fraternities owed the college almost half a million dollars. TRUSTEE
REPORT at 6.
Although the Report in its introduction addresses its ban to both "fraternities and
sororities," fraternities were clearly the concern. "Sororities at Colby have obviously
not suffered from many of the problems which have affected the fraternity system."
TRUSTEE REPORT at 13. Sororities never had their own houses and were never a pre-
dominant feature of campus life. See Hokanson supra note 31, at 2 n.6.
The college's decision to withdraw its official support of fraternities was unsuccess-
fully challenged on contract and constitutional grounds by Lambda Chi and other
fraternities in Chi Realty Corp. v. Colby College, 513 A.2d 866, 868 (Me. 1986).
32. TRUSTEE REPORT, supra note 31, at 10; Kimberly A. Hokanson, The Role of
College Fraternities in the 1980's: A Comparative Study of Bowdoin and Colby Col-
leges 8 (June 2, 1986) (unpublished paper prepared as part of Ph.D. program at
Harvard University Graduate School of Education).
33. See Colby and Fraternities: Where We Stand (August 1990) (unpublished
memorandum about the fraternity lawsuit distributed by Colby College
administration).
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policy prohibiting any participation in fraternities.34
The college had hoped that without houses, financing, and other
support from the administration, the fraternities would dis-
band-particularly once all students who had belonged to the offi-
cially sanctioned groups had graduated. 5 Although the sororities
soon dissolved,3 6 most of the male Greek organizations continued
and even thrived underground.37 In 1990, after six years of continu-
ing campus problems related to fraternities, the college decided to
punish a group of students for belonging to Lambda Chi.3
8
34. In 1988 the administration asked students on athletic teams and dorm staff to
sign an agreement stating that they would not join fraternities. Colby and Fraterni-
ties: Where We Stand 6 (August 1990), supra note 33. The college also sent letters to
new students stating that "anyone found to have engaged in perpetuating these orga-
nizations will be subject to suspension." Brief for Appellant at 8, Phelps v. President
& Trustees of Colby College, 595 A.2d 403 (Me. 1991) (No. CV-90-287).
35. Hokanson, supra note 31, at 6. See also Denise Goodman, Colby Rules, Fra-
ternity Rights at Issue, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Aug. 5, 1990, at 63.
36. Hokanson, supra note 31, at 8-9.
37. Frat parties, such as Bison Night-an all-campus party traditionally
sponsored by Lambda Chi following the last football game of the sea-
son-were sponsored by "former" fraternity members. Similarly, members
of Zeta Psi threw the ever-popular "Alabama Slammers" party while DU
continued to sponsor parties featuring a drink called "The Green
Death.". . . In April of 1986, almost two years after fraternities were
banned, the student newspaper printed a full-page advertisement for an all-
campus "tent party" in the new student center. The ad was framed by the
initials PDT-Phi Delta Theta.
Hokanson, supra note 31, at 5-6.
In 1986, the college discovered a pledge test and a dues book indicating that groups
were actively recruiting new members, but the college refrained from taking any dis-
ciplinary action against members. Id. at 7. At that time, the Dean of Students issued
a statement urging students to reject fraternity membership because it was inimical
to "a fully open, non-exclusionary, and non-discriminatory community." Id. at 8
(quoting Janice A. Seitzinger, Open letter to the Colby College community (April 16,
1986)).
At the beginning of the 1988-89 academic year, six of the former nine fraternities
continued to maintain a presence at Colby. Hokanson, supra note 31, at 8. Almost as
many students-approximately 20% of the male student body-belonged to fraterni-
ties in that year as in 1984, when fraternities were banned. Id. at 9.
38. COLBY CURRENTS, Summer 1990, at 5-7; Colby and Fraternities: Where We
Stand (August 1990), supra note 33. In 1988-89, the college did begin to take a
stronger stand against fraternities, without imposing disciplinary measures for mem-
bership. For example, the college denied official recognition to campus parties with
fraternity themes, students were warned that wearing Greek-letter insignia could
spark investigations of illegal activity relating to fraternities, and at least one profes-
sor denied letters of recommendation to students demonstrating fraternity involve-
ment. Hokanson, supra note 31, at 10.
In 1987, five students were disciplined for stealing S2,000 worth of linens from Wa-
terville motels in an incident "generally understood to be fraternity activity." Colby
and Fraternities: Where We Stand 5 (August 1990). In December 1988, six Colby
students were arrested for stealing Christmas ornaments from local residents. "The
students, all members of the 1988 pledge class of Zeta Psi, had been instructed by
[Vol. 44:261
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Early that year, the college had faced increasing problems of
fights, hazing, and vandalism in the dorms, reportedly caused by
Lambda Chi pledging activities."9 In March of 1990, the state police
were called to investigate a disturbance in a grange hall.40 They dis-
covered a group of fifty or more male Colby students who said they
were participating in a Lambda Chi initiation ritual.' A document
signed by a list of pledges described the ceremony establishing
brotherhood through a process of spanking, sliding naked on beer-
soaked plastic, and severing the heads of cows and chickens.' 2
upperclass Zete brothers to supply decorations for the fraternity's Christmas
party. . . . The college made a decision, as one administrator put it, to go after the
'drug dealers' rather than the 'users.'" Hokanson, supra note 31, at 10. In exchange
for lenient punishment of the arrested students (100 hours of community service), the
upperclass Zete brothers agreed to disband their group. Id. at 11. Also that same
winter, the college responded in the same way to a similar theft by pledges of another
fraternity. Id.
39. Colby and Fraternities: Where We Stand 6-7 (August 1990), supra note 33.
40. Denise Goodman, Colby Rules, Fraternity Rights at Issue, BosroN SUNDAY
GLOBE, Aug. 5, 1990, at 63.
41. Id.
42. An excerpt from the pledge document:
First, each of us began as an individual this was represented on the shield
by the phrase "VIR QUISQUE VIR" meaning each man a man.. . . The
first step of our journey was from being individuals to becoming pledges
. . . we became Neophytes, "a newly planted seed in the enriched soil of
Lambda Chi Alpha." . . . The next stage was our birth. On Father-son
night there were many symbols of this. We slid out of the womb naked and
pure represented through the naked-beer slides. We were also spanked by
our fathers represented by the paddling, and Baptized by our Fathers when
the beer was poured in our faces. The jubilant father then smoked cigars
with his fellow brothers, celebrating our birth. We were removed from the
darkness with the removal of our hoods, and were introduced to our lineage.
We realize this was achieved only after passing three tests for breaking our
bond.
Defendant's Exhibit 1, Phelps v. President & Trustees of Colby College, 595 A.2d 403
(Me. 1991) (No. CV-90-287). One student, a staffperson of the dormitory where a
number of the Lambda Chi pledges lived, described reports of the Lambda Chi initia-
tion: "They were required to sit in a circle, take acid, and couldn't move. Some of the
pledges returned with bruises 'from running into the same threaded pipe.' Some of
the pledges had blood on them and there have been various reports ranging from
pledges asked to beat each other up and chickens being cut up as part of a ritual."
Defendant's Exhibit 6, Phelps v. President & Trustees of Colby College, 595 A.2d 403
(Me. 1991) (No. CV-90-287).
The Lambda Chi rituals symbolizing birth and featuring sexual imagery, spanking,
and brutality against animals are not unusual or unique to Colby. One anthropologist
analyzed college fraternity initiation rituals in the U.S. as a means of training young
men in male dominance. PEGGY REEVES SANDAY, FRATERNITY GANG RAPE SFax. BRonit-
ERHOOD. AND PRIVILEGE ON CAMPUS (1990). Sanday finds that a central theme of many
fraternity initiations is to redefine traits traditionally associated with women-such
as birth-into male-controlled forms. Id. at 154. These rituals serve to construct a
masculine identity that builds brotherhood through homophobia and misogyny. Id. at
155.
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Under pressure from the college administration, Lambda Chi
members came forward to the school and admitted that they had
violated the college's rules against fraternity involvement. 3 A series
of meetings between the Colby administration, faculty, staff, and
student groups culminated in the college's decision to sanction the
students for their fraternity participation. 4 The college barred the
Lambda Chi seniors from marching in graduation ceremonies and
suspended the underclassmen for one semester. 45
The Maine Civil Liberties Union (MCLU) decided to take up the
cause of the punished fraternity members. It initiated a suit under
the Maine Civil Rights Act, claiming that Colby had interfered by
threat, intimidation, or coercion with the Lambda Chi members'
rights to freedom of association and freedom of speech. Civil liber-
ties lawyers joined national fraternity leaders in portraying the fra-
ternity case as part of a dangerous new wave of intolerance sweeping
Another author describes the function of fraternities in preserving both male
homosocial bonds and homophobia:
It is a striking fact that friendships in America, especially male friend-
ships, are not as deep as in other cultures. The American male suspects
that there is something sissified about a devoted and demonstrative friend-
ship, except between a man and a woman, and then it must pass over into
love, or perhaps just into sex. In their clubs and associations, however, at
first in school clubs and college fraternities and later in secret lodges or
women's clubs, Americans find a level of friendship that does not lay them
open to the charge of being sentimental. In his clubs a man is not ashamed
to call another man "brother .. "
Max Lerner, The Joiners, in AMERICA'S VOLUNTARY SPIRIT: A BOOK OF READINGS 82,
83 (Brian O'Connell ed., 1983).
43. Colby and Fraternities: Where We Stand (August 1990), supra note 33; Brief
for Appellants at 11-17, Phelps v. President & Trustees of Colby College, 595 A.2d
903 (Me. 1991) (No. CV-90-287) (describing pressure put on Lambda Chi members to
come forward to the administration).
44. See Colby and Fraternities: Where We Stand 7-9 (August 1990), supra note
33. "In a practice that has become common when Colby deals with controversy, Cot-
ter launched a campus-wide dialogue, inviting the views of students, faculty members
and alumni. In 10 days, he received 125 letters, many urging strong sanctions." De-
nise Goodman, Colby Rules, Fraternity Rights at Issue, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Aug.
5, 1990, at 63. One student letter described a dorm meeting on the issue: "The head
resident made the comment that 'they obviously can't expel 63 people.' The response
that she received surprised both of us and may interest you: 50 people said, spontane-
ously but in near-perfect unison, 'Why not?"' 'Underground' Frats Call It Quits,
Ending Uneasy Six-Year Transition, COLBY CURRENTS, Summer 1990, at 6.
45. Pledges were placed on disciplinary probation and required to complete 50
hours of community service. All Lambda Chi members were suspended from extra-
curricular activities, including athletics, for the remainder of the spring term. As a
result of appeals which successfully argued mitigating circumstances, a number of
students had their sanctions reduced. Colby and Fraternities: Where We Stand 9
(August 1990), supra note 33. In meetings and letters to the administration before
the sanctions were imposed, a number of students demanded that the fraternity
members be punished by expulsion, not just suspension. COLBY CURRENTS, Summer
1990, at 6.
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the country as colleges force "politically correct" views on
students."'
Colby College, in reply, argued that it had "the right, and indeed
the duty, to determine that its educational mission is furthered by
maintaining a college community that is free from fraternity activi-
ties and free from sexism, exclusivity, disruptive behavior, hazing,
and other antisocial activities of the kind engaged in by Plaintiffs in
this case."" The college described the case as a traditional college
disciplinary issue, rather than a civil rights issue."B
Colby further claimed that its constitutionally protected right to
freedom of association would be violated by requiring it to enroll
students belonging to fraternities.'
C. The Court Decisions: Phelps v. President & Trustees of Colby
College
The trial court ruled against the fraternities. Justice Donald Alex-
ander decided that a broad civil rights law barring private interfer-
ence with First Amendment rights would create a constitutional
puzzle.50 In traditional First Amendment law, protection from gov-
46. See Richard O'Meara, Esq., Oral Argument Before the Law Court in Phelps v.
President & Trustees of Colby College (May 1, 1991) (tape recording on file with
author); Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1. 16, Phelps v. President & Trustees of
Colby College, 595 A.2d 403 (Me. 1991) (No. AND-90-511) (tape recording on file
with the author). "In [Colby President William Cotter's) attempts to create the per-
fect Mecca for political correctness, he has essentially made it a crime punishable by
expulsion to be a heterosexual male who chooses to formalize his friendship with
other like-minded friends away from campus ...." Gregory E. McElroy. national
executive director of the Zeta Psi Fraternity, quoted in Colby Defends Crackdown on
Underground Fraternities, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, May 2, 1991, at ID.
Much press has been devoted to debating and analyzing the so-called "political
correctness" movement and its critics. See, e.g., Steven C. Bahls, Political Correct-
ness and the American Law School, 69 WASH. U LQ 1041 and n.2 (1991); Steve
France, Hate Goes to College, 76 AB.A. J. 44 (1990); Barbara Schulman, Feminists,
Political Correctness, and 'Free' Speech, SOJOURNER: THE WOMsEN's FORU, Oct.
1991, at 19; Patricia J. Williams, Blockbusting the Canon, Ms, Sept/Oct. 1991, at 59;
Marc Wortman, Fighting Words, YALE ALUMNI MAC, Oct. 1991, at 56.
47. Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 1, Phelps v. President & Trustees of Colby
College, 595 A.2d 403 (Me. 1991) (No. CV-90-287).
48. MacMahon, Colby's attorney, said the students were disciplined for vio-
lating the college's rules and engaging in conduct that disrupted other stu-
dents who were trying to sleep or study .... He said past court decisions
have upheld the rights of colleges to make and enforce rules of conduct for
students. "These plaintiffs all came to Colby knowing those rules. They
chose to attend Colby knowing it was a non-fraternity college."
Colby Defends Crackdown on Underground Fraternities, PORTLAND PRESs HERALD.
May 2, 1991, at 1D.
49. Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 22-30, Phelps v. President & Trustees of
Colby College, 595 A.2d 403 (No. CV-90-287).
50. Phelps v. President & Trustees of Colby College, No. CV-90-287 at 15 (Me.
Super. Ct., And. Cty., Aug. 22, 1990), aff'd, 595 A.2d 403 (Me. 1991).
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ernment restrictions should not present a dilemma between the
right to expression and the right to exclude expression because the
government theoretically should not take sides in the marketplace of
ideas and has no rights itself to free expression and association. But
in applying a statute that bars private interference with First
Amendment rights, the court confronts the separate First Amend-
ment rights of the private interfering party.
The Superior Court quoted First Circuit Judge Frank Coffin's
opinion in Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc.: "The
freedom of mediating institutions, newspapers, universities, political
associations, and artistic organizations and individuals themselves to
pick and choose among ideas, to winnow, to criticize, to investigate,
to elaborate, to protest, to support, to boycott, and even to reject is
essential if 'free speech' is to prove meaningful. '' "l In that case,
plaintiff Vanessa Redgrave had asserted a First Amendment right to
perform with the orchestra regardless of her views on Palestinian
rights. The orchestra, in turn, had asserted a First Amendment right
to choose its performers based on its own preferences.2
Turning to the Colby case, Justice Alexander observed that, "our
constitutional freedom to associate, in private organizations, with
persons of similar interests necessarily implies a right to exclude
those with divergent interests. ' 53 The court resolved this conflict be-
tween the associational rights of the fraternity and the college by
restricting the state Civil Rights Act to state action."4 It narrowly
interpreted the Act's phrase "rights secured by the constitution" to
encompass only the right to be free from state interference with
freedom of association and expression, despite the statute's addi-
tional phrase "whether or not under color of law."55 Even though
51. Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888, 904 (1st Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1043 (1989).
52. Judge Coffin, however, did not resolve these potential constitutional difficul-
ties by rejecting the well-established precedent and the clear statutory language that
allows the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act to reach private action. Id. at 900-01.
In response to certified questions from the federal court, several members of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated that the Act does not impose liability
where a defendant is exercising a right to be free from compelled expression. Id. at
909, 911-12. "[A] person exercising constitutional rights who interferes with another's
constitutional rights is not . . . interfering with the rights of another person by
'threats, intimidation, or coercion,'" within the meaning of [the Massachusetts Act]."
Id. at 907, quoting Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, 502 N.E.2d 1375, 1377
(1987). Relying in part on this discussion of state law, Judge Coffin held that the
orchestra was not liable under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act and that it was
unnecessary to reach federal constitutional issues. Id. at 911-12.
53. Phelps v. President & Trustees of Colby College, No. CV-90-287, at 16, (Me.
Super. Ct., And. Cty., Aug. 22, 1990), aff'd, 595 A.2d 403 (Me. 1991).
54. Id.
55. Compare Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 613-14 n.29
(1979) and United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755 (1966) (right is "secured by"
constitution if it is protected by the constitution) with Guest, 383 U.S. at 779 (Bren-
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the Maine law was based on a similar Massachusetts Civil Rights
Act, the court refused to follow the established Massachusetts prece-
dent which interpreted that identical language in the Massachusetts
Act as reaching private action.56
On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law
Court, affirmed the decision. The Law Court expanded on the lower
court's concern about the issue of conflicting First Amendment
rights. At oral argument, one Justice noted an inherent contradic-
tion in the MCLU's defense of the fraternity's freedom of associa-
tion right against private interference."' If the Maine Civil Rights
Act requires Colby to sacrifice its associational values to tolerate
those it wants to exclude (fraternities), then it would also require
Colby's fraternities to sacrifice their associational values to tolerate
those they want to exclude (women).
Civil liberties advocates left unanswered the question whether
they would sue on behalf of women students who insisted on a free-
dom of association right to associate as members of Lambda Chi
against the fraternity's wishes. Such a case is currently being
brought against a Middlebury College fraternity." Echoing the
Colby fraternities in reverse, the Middlebury fraternity protested
that its constitutional rights will be violated if it is forced to accept
unwanted members-and that the college's demands that they ac-
cept women are "the latest outbreak of political correctness in the
Northeast." '59
In its decision refusing to favor the fraternities' associational
rights over the college's associational rights, the Maine Law Court
employed the same reasoning as the MCLU, with opposite results:
"Even the most intolerant members of our society, however, enjoy,
subject to the limitations imposed by law, the right of free speech
and association. 60 The attorney for the MCLU declared that the
nan, J., dissenting) (right can be "secured by" constitution if it "emanates" from
constitution).
56. Phelps v. President & Trustees of Colby College. No. CV-90-287, at 13 (Me.
Super. Ct., And. Cty., Aug. 22, 1990), affd, 595 A.2d 403 (Me. 1991). citing Redgrave
v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 502 N.E.2d 1375 (Mass. 1987). For Massachu-
setts cases reaching private violations of constitutional rights, see Bell v. Mazza, 474
N.E.2d 1111 (Mass. 1985); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 473 N.E.2d 1128, 1131
(Mass. 1985).
57. See Richard O'Meara, Esq., Oral Argument Before the Law Court in Phelps v,.
President & Trustees of Colby College (May 1, 1991) (tape recording on file with
author).
58. Anthony Flint, Greek Might, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 6. 1991, at B1. The frater-
nity at issue in the Middlebury case, Delta Kappa Epsilon, includes in its male mem-
bership President Bush, Vice President Dan Quayle, and former President Gerald
Ford. Id.
59. Id.
60. Phelps v. President & Trustees of Colby College, 595 A.2d 403, 407 (Me.
1991).
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court's decision limiting the scope of the Maine Civil Rights Act
"basically repeals the statute. It renders it meaningless from a civil
rights standpoint."6 ' Justice Daniel Wathen's opinion for the court
admitted, "We are mindful that our decision limits the potential
utility of the Act as a means of combatting the actions of so-called
hate groups.""2
The court nevertheless decided to limit the statute, refusing to
allow the courts to "mediate disputes between private parties exer-
cising their respective rights of free expression and association.
0 3
The decision in the Colby case, however, simply allows hate groups
rather than the courts to "mediate" between private parties exercis-
ing their respective rights. Like the MCLU, the court argues that
the need for neutrality justifies its choice to favor particular rights
at the expense of others.
In the MCLU's view, the moral of liberal tolerance in the Colby
fraternity case is that a possibly undesired result (permitting frater-
nities) in the short run is worth strict adherence to neutral princi-
ples in the long run (preventing private interference with free asso-
ciation and expression). Alternatively, the moral of the case from
the court's view is that an undesired result in the short run (barring
the statute from reaching violations of civil rights by private hate
groups) is worth strict adherence to neutral principles in the long
run (preventing the government from favoring some speech over
others).6 '
So a law designed by civil rights activists to fight hate group vio-
lence has been used to defend a group with a history of hate vio-
lence-with the result that the law can no longer be used against
private hate groups. 5 The Colby fraternity case seems to present
women and other people traditionally subjected to oppression with
our typical choice of neutral principles:66 either way, we lose. Either
the law is interpreted broadly to establish the rights of private hate
groups to interfere with our freedom of association, or the law is
61. Court Backs Colby in Fraternity Suit, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, July 10,
1991, at 3D.
62. Phelps v. President & Trustees of Colby College, 595 A.2d at 407.
63. Id.
64. The contradictory use of neutral principles has been analyzed by the critical
legal studies movement as evidence of the incoherence of the traditional liberal ap-
proach to law. See, e.g., Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract
Doctrine, 94 YALE LJ. 997 (1985); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's
Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205 (1979); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES 45-51 (1987).
65. The court could have resolved the conflict of rights in this case by an interpre-
tation of the Act that would be more consistent with its legislative history and statu-
tory construction. See supra note 52; infra text accompanying notes 219-22.
66. For another case which posed similarly bad choices, see International Union,
United Auto. Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., UAW v. Johnson Con-
trols, Inc., - U.S. .. 111 S.Ct. 1196 (1991).
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interpreted narrowly so that it cannot restrict the freedom of private
hate groups to interfere with our civil rights.
IV. FEMINIST METHOD CONFRONTS LIBERAL LAW
How can feminist jurisprudence rewrite this story? The main-
stream media tend to portray feminism as an offshoot (or a pawn17 )
of liberalism. 8 Yet the dilemma posed by the Maine Civil Rights
Act and the Colby fraternity case-one example of the current de-
bate over "hate speech" and other so-called political correctness is-
sues6 -brings to the surface some of the conflicts between liberal
and feminist methodologies.
1
In the traditional liberal view of law, injustice is a problem of par-
tiality. Liberal civil rights advocates seek to require us to surrender
our personal biases to the control of rational principles so that we
treat "others" who are "different" like ourselves. In the epitome of
liberal ideology, the American Civil Liberties Union defends the
rights of the Klan and the Nazis no matter how offensive the ACLU
finds these groups.7' In this civil libertarian view, only by obeying
neutral principles instead of personal feelings can everyone be pro-
tected from the prejudice and oppression that hate groups
encourage.
In the Colby case, the MCLU argued that by protecting groups
such as Lambda Chi, it will secure the freedom of the women and
men who disagree with Lambda Chi's expressive activity. A leader of
67. Senator Orrin G. Hatch charged that Professor Anita Hill was simply a tool of
liberal groups looking for an excuse to defeat the nomination of Justice Clarence
Thomas when she testified that Thomas had sexually harassed her. Andrew Rosen-
thai, A Terrible Wrong Has Been Done, But to Whom?, N Y Ta~ms, Sunday Oct. 13,
1991, § 4 at 1. Others developed this charge into a more elaborate story. See William
Safire, The Plot to Savage Thomas, NY TIMES, Oct. 14, 1991, at A19.
68. By the terms "liberalism" and "liberal," I mean to refer to the dominant polit-
ical theory of contemporary Western society, which originated in the Enlightenment
philosophy in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe. and which emphasizes
the primacy and autonomy of the individual in opposition to the state. See, e g. JOHN
LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Thomas 1. Cook ed. 1947); JEAN JACQUES
ROUSSEAU, POLITICAL WRITINGS (C. E. Vaughn ed. 1953): JoHN STtART MIL., ON LIB-
ERTY (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed. 1974).
69. See supra note 46.
70. For some examples of scholarship contrasting liberal theory to feminist the-
ory, see ZILLAH R EISENSTEIN, THE RADICAL FUTURE OF LIBERAL FEMINISMt (1981);
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF TIHE STATE 155-250 (1989).
71. See. e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1205-07 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. dented,
439 U.S. 916 (1978); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: . Mod-
est Proposal?, 1990 DuKE L.J. 484 (1990) (hereinafter, Strossen, A Modest ProposaV);
Nadine Strossen and Mary Ellen Gale, The Real ACLU, 2 YALE J L & FEMINISMI 161
(1990); ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING My ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS. THE SKOKIE CASE. AND
THE RISKS OF FREEDOM (1979); Norman Dorsen, Is There a Right to Stop O!ensive
Speech? The Case of the Nazis in Skokie, in CIVIL LIBERTIES IN CONFLICT 133-34
(Larry Gostin ed. 1988).
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the MCLU explained: "It is by defending the rights of unpopular
groups that the rights of all people, including civil rights activists,
anti-war protestors, and religious and political dissenters are pro-
tected: As Thomas Paine wrote, 'He that would make his own lib-
erty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression, for if he
violates this duty, he establishes a precedent that will reach to
himself.' "2
In the liberal view, I should start my legal analysis of the Colby
case by putting aside my personal experiences with Lambda Chi, not
by focusing on them-the opposite of the feminist method. 7 3 The
liberal perspective narrates the Colby fraternity case as a classic ex-
ample of the struggle between principle and emotion. According to
this story, when I speak about fraternity violence against women,
I'm talking about emotional personal experience. Those who speak
about fraternity rights to freedom of expression are talking about
universal rational principles. And in this story, when wayward emo-
tion surrenders herself to the force of noble principle, both will live
happily ever after.
But I'm using personal experiences with Colby fraternities to chal-
lenge the legal mythology that separates "neutral principle" from
personal experience. By focusing on personal experiences of
prejudice, feminist method can show that civil rights violations are
often failures of perception as much as failures of principle.74 Yet
efforts to correct for this failure of perception are often attacked as
failures of principle.
Law is about constructing reality as much as following principles.
Being principled provides no security against being unjust when
harm to women and others on the social margin is made invisible or
irrelevant. As long as violence does not count as real, real violence
will often be legal no matter how firmly it is outlawed.
72. Letter to the editor from Sally Sutton, Executive Director, Maine Civil Liber-
ties Union, ME. TIMES, July 27, 1990, at 13. Thomas Paine's legacy persists in more
ways than one: his eloquent assertion of civil liberties principles coincided with his
support for laws criminalizing speech critical of the government. See David Kairys,
Freedom of Speech, THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 242 (David
Kairys ed., 2d ed. 1990) (citing LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 347-
48 (1985)).
73. For example, one response to my criticisms of the MCLU's position began:
Her analysis is so flawed that I'm surprised that you printed it at all ....
First, she uses personal experience to prove a rule. I have no doubt that she
and others were in fact harassed and even worse by persons belonging to
fraternities, and even persons acting in the name of certain fraternities. But
this no more proves that fraternities are inherently male-dominated or vio-
lent than attacks by some Protestants against some Catholics and vice
versa prove that all Catholics and Protestants are psychopaths.
Seth Berner, Counterpoint The Newsletter of the National Lawyers Guild (Southern
Maine Chapter), Nov. 1990, at 4.
74. See Rhode, supra note 17, at 1735 (describing "perception as the problem").
[Vol. 44:261
COLBY FRATERNITY CASE
I recount my experiences with fraternities not to prove that fra-
ternities should be banned as a general rule, but to explore how vio-
lence against women by privileged white men is often not perceived
as real in our society. The Colby fraternity case is in part a dispute
about gender. The fraternities at issue define themselves by their
exclusion of all women.75 The legal debate over the right to belong
to fraternities exposes the boundaries of masculine identity, and
raises questions about the principles and perceptions that shape
that identity.
My personal stories of Colby fraternities demonstrate emerging
interpretations of my own experiences, including my own denial and
biased perceptions.76 I am generalizing my personal experiences of
some Colby fraternities as examples of misogyny, but not simply
misogyny; the interaction of gender, race, class, and sexual identity
produced a culture of denial of privileged male violence. Women of
varied race, class, sexual, political and cultural identities and physi-
cal characteristics were targets of harassment by some of Colby's
fraternities, in different forms and degrees. Yet women were by no
means the exclusive targets. Fraternity violence and harassment
against men often served to maintain a gendered hierarchy that not
only subordinated those defined as female, but also subordinated
men who were perceived as deviating from these fraternities' con-
struction of masculinity."7
Although the Colby fraternities were not all exclusively white, I
75. As a Colby student, I questioned the centrality of the fraternities' male iden-
tity-thinking that maybe the exclusion and subordination of women was an out-
dated habit many fraternities could be persuaded to discard. I gained a deeper appre-
ciation of the problem when I circulated a petition urging fraternities to admit
women: many of the brothers patiently explained to me that the bonds of loyalty,
friendship, and respect that constitute fraternities cannot exist between men and
women. One Colby woman spoke in support of the fraternities by explaining that
women can avoid fraternity mistreatment "as long as they (frat brothers) view you as
an intelligent and interesting person, rather than as a girl." Robin Yorks, Women
Speak Out On Frats, COLBY ECHO, Mar. 14, 1980, at 7 (interviewing anonymous
Colby student).
The exclusion of women still remains central to many college fraternities. See. e.g..
Tess Nacelewicz, Bowdoin Restricts Frats, Sororities, Ma SUNDAY TELEGRM., Mar. 8.
1992, at 5B (announcing plans to fight ban on single-sex fraternity houses, fraternity
leader "drew the line at admitting women"). A sociological study concluded that "fra-
ternities are vitally concerned-more than with anything else-with masculinity."
Patricia Yancy Martin & Robert A. Hummer, Fraternities and Rape on Campus, 3
GENDER & SOC'Y 457, 460 (Dec. 1989).
76. I take seriously admonitions against universalizing from personal experience.
yet I believe it is neither possible nor useful to transcend all personal perspectives or
to avoid any generalization. Instead, I hope to recognize my generalizations from my
(white, economically privileged) experience as provisional and to hold them open to
criticism and revision.
77. This fraternal masculinity is defined in terms of heterosexuality, class, race.
and physical appearance. See, e.g., Martin & Hummer, supra note 75, at 460-61. 471.
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believe it is fair to characterize Colby fraternities as predominately
white, both in terms of membership and cultural focus.7 8 I exper-
ienced fraternity harassment and violence exclusively from white
men. My claim is that similar actions would not have provoked a
comparable degree of institutional denial if these actions were per-
petrated by organized groups predominantly composed of men of
color or lower class white men against middle or upper class white
women.
79
V. PERSONAL EXPERIENCES OF PRIVILEGED VIOLENCE
To live so completely impervious to one's own impact on others is
a fragile privilege, which over time relies ... on the inability of
others . . . to make their displeasure heard.
-Patricia J. Williams"
A. Normal Experience
When I was a Colby student, going to class meant getting up early
and sneaking out the freight tunnel to avoid the fraternity pledges
on the hall who blocked the doorways and held dorm women captive
until we watched them pull their pants down.8 1 It meant risking the
daily trauma of "frat row" (the central thoroughfare of the campus
that was lined with seven fraternity houses8 2), where we faced a
gauntlet of fraternity men who drenched us with buckets of water,
chased us with large nets, threw beer and other objects at us, yelled
sexual insults at us, and rated us as sex objects.8 3 Once, on her way
78. Colby's President William Cotter testified that one reason for the decision to
ban Colby's fraternities was their encouragement of "racist behavior." Alberta Cook,
Judge Affirms Colby's Action Against 16 Seniors, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, May 25,
1990, at 10.
79. However, this systematic denial is not limited to violence perpetrated by priv-
ileged white men. For example, efforts to recognize battering in lesbian relationships
are just beginning. See NAMING THE VIOLENCE: SPEAKING OUT ABOUT LESBIAN BAT-
TERING (Kerry Lobel ed., 1986). The identity of the victim as well as the identity of
the perpetrator shapes cultural and legal perceptions of violence. See McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
80. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 72.
81. A similar practice of some fraternity members on other campuses is often
termed "bagging." ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE: THE Ms. REPORT ON
RECOGNIZING. FIGHTING AND SURVIVING DATE AND ACQUAINTANCE RAPE 108 (1988).
82. Peggy Reeves Sanday describes a similar structure called "the Walk" at one
university marked by fraternity violence against women. SANDAY, supra note 42, at
25.
83. A 1980 student newspaper commentary supportive of fraternities nevertheless
agreed that fraternity abuse of women was a serious problem: "Women [at Colby)
really have not moved beyond the role of 'frivolous commodities,' .... Until a wo-
man can walk down frat row without the fear of being netted, soaked or rated, Colby
students cannot claim that attitudes have changed." Erin Ireton and Sonia Turcotte,
Speaking from Chi Omega: Our Perspectives on Sexism and Frats. THE COLBY Ectio,
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across campus, one of my roommates suffered a broken ear drum
when she was hit on the head and knocked off her bicycle by an
object thrown at her from a fraternity balcony.8 4
Campus life meant eating lunch to the sounds of women scream-
ing in pain blasting from stereos from the tightly shuttered Lambda
Chi house during "hell week." It meant returning to our dorm rooms
to find notes on our doors from fraternity pledges containing sexual
insults directed at us by name. It meant waking up at night to find
our fraternity pledge classmates breaking into our dorm rooms in
their underwear, or maybe just smashing telephones and furniture
in the halls. It meant living with posters in my dormitory lounge
listing which fraternity pledge on my hall was named "da balls" of
the week and reporting whether he had accomplished sufficient sex-
ual harassment of dorm women to earn his title.
It meant learning the rules of dominance and subordination: such
as the rule that KDRs were not allowed to display affection toward
women in public (my dorm advisor explained to new students how
she secretly arranged to talk with her boyfriend by meeting behind
the tea dispenser);"5 or the rule that the tables in the front of the
dining hall were reserved for Lambda Chis and no women could sit
there even when the tables were empty. It meant learning the lan-
guage of women-hating-as in the term "ledging," which referred to
the KDR ritual whereby the fraternity arranges for a gang of broth-
ers to watch while a pledge has sex with a woman who is unaware of
the brothers' participation.8 It meant learning the habit of male
Mar. 7, 1980, at 19.
84. Although she reported this incident to the college, no disciplinary or legal ac-
tion resulted from this incident, since no individuals could be identified (she had not
seen who had hit her).
85. Peggy Reeves Sanday describes how some fraternity cultures construct sexual
relationships:
As they dominate and control the women who satisfy their sexual desire.
the brothers separate sexual feelings from emotions of love and compassion.
Such emotions are reserved for brothers. Party sex is the glue that binds
the brothers to the fraternity body. The fraternal bond helps to transform
infantile feelings of dependency on women by transferring these feelings to
men.
SANDAY, supra note 42, at 37.
86. My impression as a Colby student was that the term "ledging" originated
from the KDR fraternity's location: the rock ledges from an old quarry outside the
fraternity house's picture windows were rumored to provide a convenient setting for
viewing into bedrooms. An elder local resident recently told me that this quarry was
the site of Ku Klux Klan rituals in the 1930s, when the Klan was actively persecuting
French-Canadians in Maine.
Another version of the origins of the term "ledging" is that it "refers to the wo-
man's being driven to the point of suicide by the harassment" that the woman (tradi-
tionally a first-year student) receives afterwards. WARSHAW, supra note 81, at 109.
The practice of groups of fraternity brothers watching one brother have sex with a
woman, without the woman's knowledge, is a ritual found in similar forms in other
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ownership and female deference so well that ten years after graduat-
ing one woman returning to viiit the campus tells me she uncon-
sciously walks out of her way to avoid what was once fraternity row.
Above all, this everyday life with fraternities at Colby meant
learning to count injustice as normal, and to discount white male
fraternity violence as unreal.
B. Privileged Injustice
Why did my experiences of assault and harassment by Colby fra-
ternity members seem like normal life instead of grave injustice?
Colby did not lack good people with good principles. But their prin-
ciples often appeared to be built from emotional attachments to old
stories that told about evil coming from distant others, not from lib-
eral, well-educated white men like themselves.
Here are some experiences of firm principles and failed
perception:
It was 1978, at Colby College. My sociology professor told our
class his liberal solution to crime: we shouldn't punish criminals or
try to rehabilitate them by controlling their behavior. Instead we
should integrate criminals into communities that encourage positive
goals. He told us he had designed an alternative sentencing program
that would provide convicted young men with the opportunity to
live in the dorms of elite liberal arts colleges like Colby so that the
student community could re-socialize them with good values. I
couldn't articulate why his theory bothered me. I didn't talk in his
class.
It was 1979. One of my favorite professors, a wise and loving man,
was leading a class discussion about ethics and equality. He told us
about his experiences with the black civil rights movement. He
spoke of how deeply moved he felt watching a young black girl qui-
etly walking to school through a gauntlet of angry white southerners
throwing things and shouting insults at her.
Next he talked about the women's movement. Sexism seemed dif-
ferent and less extreme to him than racism, not to mention sepa-
rate.87 He did not think that gender-based violence is often used to
subordinate women. He returned to the image of the black girl walk-
ing to school through the crowd of jeering, threatening whites, and
said he didn't think that kind of explicit prejudice based on gender
exists.
fraternities. See SANDAY, supra note 42, at 32 (describing the practice of "beaching"
at one fraternity).
87. This class (myself included) apparently began from the biased premise that
the "women" who were the subject of our discussion on sexism were white, and that
the white violence we were discussing against black women was solely a problem of
racism. For criticisms of the traditional legal separation of race and sex discrimina-
tion, see supra note 20.
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For the first time in that class, I spoke up. I said that signs had
just been posted around campus warning that a female student had
been assaulted while running on a rural road near campus and that
women should not run alone. I said that I felt restricted and unequal
because of this violence. No one mentioned fraternity row."s
VI. PRINCIPLED FANTASIES OF SELECTIVE SUFFERING
The liberal dichotomy between universal principle and individual
preference ends up privileging certain experiences as principles and
discounting marginalized perceptions as individual preferences. The
separation of universal principle from particular experience reen-
forces a system of implied presumptions (sometimes seemingly ir-
rebuttable) that perceptions by people of color and white women are
not credible, particularly if those perceptions speak of oppression
and contradict the perceptions of privileged white men.89
88. The denial of abusive fraternity behavior sometimes took absurd proportions.
similar to the denial shown by families who go to great pains to contort reality in
order to protect an alcoholic from being discovered. One student tried to persuade
college authorities to remove a sheep traditionally used in initiation rituals and kept
tied in plain view for several days outside the Lambda Chi house directly across from
what was then the student center. Officials denied that there were any sheep on cam-
pus, and only agreed to remove the sheep when the student said that she planned to
notify state animal welfare authorities. A newspaper story recently told of failed per-
ceptions at another elite Maine college: "Bates College officials in Lewiston reacted
with dismay this week after learning of a decades-long practice of prohibiting French
employees from speaking their language when English-speaking people are around."
Karlene K. Hale, Bates College Officials Shocked: Didn't Know Certain Workers
Barred from Speaking French, KENNEBEC JOURNAL, Nov. 21, 1991, at 6. The rule ap-
plied to cafeteria and maintenance workers. Lewiston, the city where Bates is located.
has one of the largest French-Canadian communities in the state.
The dean of the college insisted that "No one, except in those isolated pockets, was
aware of [the policy]." Id. Although college officials took swift and strong action to
end the practice and to affirm the college's desire to "celebrate their multiplicity,"
the fact that "no one" was aware of a policy that was enforced for more than a decade
on many workers contained in "isolated pockets" suggests that campus multiplicity
has had little to do with college officials' reality. See id.
89. Patricia J. Williams describes these presumptions:
[T]he social consequence of concluding that we are liars operates as a kind
of public absolution of racism-the conclusion is not merely that we are
troubled or that I am eccentric, but that we, as liars, are the norm. ... It
is interesting to recall the outcry in every national medium, from the New
York Post to the Times to the major networks, in the wake of the [Tawana
Brawley case: who will ever again believe a black woman who cries rape by
a white man? . . . Now shift the frame a bit, and imagine a white male
facing a consensus that he lied. Would there be a difference? Consider
Charles Stuart, for example, the white Bostonian who accused a black man
of murdering his pregnant wife and whose brother later alleged that in fact
the brothers had conspired to murder her. . . . There was not a story I
could find that carried on about "who will ever believe" the next white man
who cries murder.
WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 242-43 n.5.
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Some criticisms of traditional "masculinist" legal method draw on
the work of Carol Gilligan to advocate for greater emphasis on per-
sonal relationships as opposed to abstract principles, or for an "ethic
of care" along with the prevailing "ethic of justice." 0 My argument,
however, is that the identification of principled, rational abstract
reasoning with men and emotional, relational values with women in-
dicates ideology more than reality. Our society tends to interpret
privileged white men's particular emotional attachments as rational,
universal principles, and to discount others' particular emotional at-
tachments as personal feelings. 1 In the dominant ideology, privi-
leged men's feelings are principled; women's feelings are personal.
A. Feeling Principled
In the Colby fraternity lawsuit, most of the discussion in the me-
dia and in the legal community has focused on the fraternity mem-
bers' perspective. The public discussion of the Colby fraternity case
shows a vivid and passionate imagining of the harms that could re-
sult from denying fraternity membership. Newspapers described
how Colby "smashed" its third underground fraternity in two
years,92 and how Colby "trampled" the rights of students. 3 When I
criticized the MCLU's position, one civil rights lawyer condemned
90. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447; Car-
rie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 39 (1985);
Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988). Carol Gilligan
analyzed how traditional standards of legal and moral reasoning are white male-bi-
ased. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982); Ellen C. DuBois, et al., Feminist Discourse, Moral
Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFF. L REV 11 (1985).
91. There has been increasing :nterest in pragmatism and contextual analysis in
contemporary legal theory and political philosophy. See, e.g., Symposium on the
Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S CAL. L. REV. 1569
(1990) [hereinafter Symposium].
"[W]e emphasize 'context' in order to expose how apparently neutral and universal
rules in effect burden or exclude anyone who does not share the characteristics of
privileged, white, Christian, able-bodied, heterosexual, adult men for whom those
rules were actually written." Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63
S CAL. L. REV. 1597, 1601 (1990). Minow and Spelman explain that contextual rea-
soning does not mean relinquishing principled reasoning and favoring relativism or
unrestrained power: "Indeed, some arguments against contextual decisionmaking of
any sort suggest a contrast between abstraction and context .... We will argue in-
stead that we are always in some context, as are the texts that we read, their authors
and readers, our problems, and our efforts to achieve solutions." Id. at 1605.
"Principles such as equality, fairness, and freedom can be defended and even ful-
filled in light of contextualized assessments of the limitations of particular rules,
given the frames of references of their authors and their expositors and given evi-
dence of the actual effects of rules on people." Id. at 1632.
92. Frat Action May Violate Civil Rights, ME TIMES, Apr. 27, 1990, at 7.
93. Daniel L. Austin, MCLU Claims Colby Trampled Rights of Underground
Fraternity Students, CENT. ME. MORNING SENTINEL, Aug. 9, 1990, at 2.
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me for "applauding" Colby's "draconian" use of "brute force."'
The MCLU described how Colby "engaged in active combat"
against "unrecognized associations to which some of its students
choose to belong. '95 According to the MCLU, Lambda Chi was
"forced to curtail the fraternity's traditional expressive activities"
and "to associate in secret out of fear." 8 A national fraternity leader
protested that Colby's President William Cotter "and his hand-
picked thought police regiment have advanced repression to new
heights." 7
The media encouraged the public to identify emotionally with the
punished fraternity men. One liberal news story began its story on
the case by putting its readers in the shoes of fraternity members as
victims of an injustice of historic proportion. "Are you now, or have
you ever been, a member of a nonsanctioned Greek letter association
while attending Colby College in Waterville? If the answer is yes,
don't admit it. . .unless you want to be blackballed from your own
graduation or suspended for a semester."98 The article did not invite
readers to identify with any of the students who supported Colby's
ban on fraternities or who had been terrorized by Lambda Chis.
Another news columnist was more dramatic in his personal identi-
fication with the punished Lambda Chi brothers, most of whom
were on the college football team."' He imagined himself as the fa-
94. Seth Berner, Counterpoint, The Newsletter of the National Lawyers Guild
(Southern Maine Chapter), Nov. 1990, at 4. My criticism of the fraternities' right to
associate at Colby College led this civil rights lawyer to apocalyptic imagery. "Her
torching of reality threatens to doom in the flames me, you and everyone else." Letter
to the editor from Seth Berner, CAsco BAY WEEKLY. Aug. 22, 1991, at 17.
95. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 19-20, Phelps v. President & Trustees
of Colby College (No. AND-90-511).
96. Plaintiffs' Trial Brief at 23, Phelps v. President & Trustees of Colby College
(No. CV-90-287), aff'd, 595 A.2d 403 (Me. 1991).
97. Written statement of George E. McElroy, executive director of Zeta Psi Fra-
ternity, quoted in Colby Defends Crackdown on Underground Fraternities, PoRT-
LAND PRESS HERALD, May 2, 1991, at ID, 2D.
A few years earlier, one fraternity member began his anonymous letter to the stu-
dent newspaper by equating the ban on fraternities to some of the worst atrocities in
human history.
Dith Pran: Genocide in Cambodia
Elie Wiesel: Genocide in Europe
Richard Hovannisian: Genocide in Armenia
How ironic it is that these lecturers have been invited to a school which at
this moment is practicing its own form of genocide. Let's face it, the current
administration and certain malicious faculty members have been executing
a program intended to completely eliminate a breed of people at
Colby-the fraternity member.
Anonymous letter to the editor, COLBY ECHO, Apr. 17. 1986. at 9 (discussed in Hokan-
son, supra note 31, at 20).
98. Frat Action May Violate Civil Rights, ME TIms., Apr. 27. 1990, at 7.
99. Tom Hanrahan, The Surreal State of Colby Football, CENT ME MORNING
SENTINEL, Apr. 24, 1990, at 13.
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ther of a Lambda Chi. In his view, to hear your son tell you he's
being kicked out of school for joining a fraternity is "wildly ab-
surd." 100 He explained, "To play football without trying to win is
more offensive to me than any amount of hazing, beer drinking or
wolf whistles. . . . [L]osing is bad for a young man's soul ....
[Colby's football] program will become a laughingstock, all because
a gang of bleeding heart liberals decided fraternities are akin to the
Khmer Rouge and L.A. street gangs."''1 1
This columnist made explicit beliefs that others held more dis-
creetly about the seriousness of men's feelings and the foolishness of
women's complaints. And he made clear the pervasive presumption
that violence by groups of predominantly white college men is at
worst immature fun, while real violence is something done by people
of color in faraway jungles like Southeast Asia and Los Angeles.10 2
This selective identification with the sufferings of privileged males
took on fantastic proportions in one law journal article defending
the rights of fraternities'0 3 (cited by the plaintiffs-appellants brief in
the Colby case0 4 ). The author rejects arguments that women's socie-
tal disadvantages may in some circumstances justify greater legal
protections for exclusively female organizations than for exclusively
male organizations. 0 5 Citing a study of widespread campus gang
rape as evidence that college men suffer from lower self-confidence
than women, the author implies that such male violence against
women means that men, not women, may be the more disadvan-
taged group. 0 6
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. For discussions of the interrelationship of racism and sexism in U.S. society,
and how this interrelationship serves to deny violence against women of color and
white women by white men, see, for example, BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN BLACK
WOMEN AND FEMINISM 51-86 (1981); Jennifer Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6
HARV. WOMEN'S LJ 103 (1983); Alisa Solomon, Unreasonable Doubt: Speaking Out
is the Contested Ground of Credibility, VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 6, 1991, at 25 (compar-
ing trial which acquitted white St. John's University students charged with sexual
assault of a black woman with trial of black teenagers accused of assaulting a white
woman in Central Park jogger case).
103. Gregory F. Hauser, Social Fraternities at Public Institutions of Higher Edu-
cation: Their Rights Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 19 J. OF LAW &
EDUc 433 (1990).
104. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Phelps v. President & Trustees of Colby
College, 595 A.2d 403 (No. AND-90-511), at 19.
105. Hauser, supra note 103, at 1 n.4, citing Chai Feldblum et al., Legal Chal-
lenges to All Female Organizations, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 171 (1986).
106. Hauser, supra note 103, at 1 n.4, citing J. EHRHART & B. SANDLER. CAMPUS
GANG RAPE: PARTY GAMES? 5 (Project on the Status of Women, Association of Ameri-
can Colleges 1985).
A cultural obsession with male suffering is astutely described by Eve Kosofsky
Sedgwick as part of her analysis of the incoherences in the construction of modern
male heterosexuality:
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B. Feeling Fantasized
In contrast to the dramatic harm associated with prohibiting
Lambda Chi membership, the public discourse about the Colby case
shows a constant turning away from and trivializing of the evidence
of fraternity violence. The Civil Liberties Union presented Lambda
Chi's history as a series of charity fundraisers and political de-
bates."' When I wrote about being forced into a bedroom and
Much might be said . . . about the production and deployment, especially
in contemporary U.S. society, of an extraordinarily high level of self-pity in
nongay men. Its effects on our national politics, and international ideology
and intervention, have been pervasive. (Snapshot, here, of the tear-welling
eyes of Oliver North.) In more intimate manifestations this straight male
self-pity is often currently referred to (though it appears to exceed) the
cultural effects of feminism, and is associated with, or appealed to in justifi-
cation of, acts of violence, especially against women.
EVE KoSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 145 (1990).
A recent and well-publicized manifestation of the "vast national wash of masculine
self-pity" that Sedgwick describes (id.) is Robert Bly's version of the "men's move-
ment." Bly mourns not the history of oppression caused by privileged white hetero-
sexual men in the United States, or the pain of their victims, but the resulting shame
that has plagued this privileged masculinity. See Bill Moyers & Robert Bly, A Gath-
ering of Men, 1990 (videotape of television program, available from Mystic Fire
Video); ROBERT BLY, IRON JOHN (1990).
107. From the MCLU Law Court brief, under the heading "The Original Lambda
Chi Alpha Fraternity":
The brothers of LCA [prior to the fraternity ban in 19841 frequently associ-
ated for social, educational, and charitable events which included expressive
activity entitled to protection under the First Amendment. These activities
included the fraternity's annual Skate-a-thon to benefit the Pine Tree
Camp for handicapped children, its annual Big Brother/Big Sister Christ-
mas Party, as well as events dedicated to the discussion and debate of is-
sues of concern to society, such as the "Fraternity Forum" programs that
brought faculty members and other prominent speakers, such as Governor
Brennan and Attorney General Tierney, to the LCA house, and a literary
society which was formed during the spring 1983 semester.
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2, Phelps v. President & Trustees of Colby College.
595 A.2d 403 (No. AND-90-511) (citing Transcript at 55-58).
The brief omits the legal events inspiring the formation of the literary society and
political forums. Lambda Chi, represented by one of the attorneys who later brought
this MCLU case, was for the first time faced with a property tax assessment by the
city of Waterville. The fraternity successfully challenged the tax in Maine's highest
court, in part by using the argument that Colby's fraternity houses are "literary and
scientific institutions" exempt from local taxes. Alpha Rho Zeta of Lambda Chi Al-
pha, Inc. v. City of Waterville, 477 A.2d 1131, 1133 (Me. 1984). See Fraternities to
Fight Property Taxes, COLBY ALUMNUS, Fall 1980, at 2. A letter in the campus news-
letter recalls the amused campus reaction to this argument:
To the Editor: I would like to thank those members of frat row who in the
past felt it their duty to harass me and other members of my sex. To date I
have only been verbally abused and propositioned three times this fall. Fur-
thermore, not even one water balloon or cup full of beer has been thrown in
my direction. ... You boys ought to be proud of your remarkable achieve-
ments, but literary and scientific institutions. . .? See you at room draw.
Sue Miller, COLBY ECHO, Dec. 10, 1981, at 19.
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knocked to the floor by pledges trying to sexually assault me, the
MCLU responded by saying that I was speaking of "potential"
violence." s
In its brief to the Law Court, the MCLU described the college's
concerns about Lambda Chi's effect on other students as "stated
sentiments" indicating a "philosophical disagreement"'10 9 with an
"unpopular"" group that "may fall out of favor" because of a "per-
ceived" adverse impact on the campus."' The MCLU contrasted the
Colby case to antidiscrimination cases showing a compelling interest
in limiting free association." 2 According to the MCLU:
All that Colby must do under the MCRA [Maine Civil Rights Act]
is refrain from taking affirmative, intentional actions to interfere
with the rights of those who choose, on their own time, to be mem-
bers of a fraternal organization which has no official affiliation with
the college ....
Given ... the ever so slight encroachment on Colby's "freedom"
to intimidate its own students (assuming Colby is entitled to assert
such an associational right in the first place), this Court cannot
help but find that Colby's alleged constitutional defense must
fail." 3
108. Letter to the editor from Sally Sutton, MCLU Executive Director, ME
TiNIES, July 27, 1990, at 13, in response to Martha McCluskey, Banning Fraternities:
Whose Civil Liberties?, ME. TIMES, July 13, 1990, at 13. That essay did not give as
detailed an account of my experience of assault as this Article does. Initial accounts
that understate sexual violence may be used as evidence of its fabrication. When she
testified in graphic detail about her alleged sexual harassment by Justice Clarence
Thomas, Anita Hill was questioned about failing to give these details in her first re-
port to the FBI. See Excerpts From Senate's Hearings on the Thomas Nomination,
N Y TiMtEs, Oct. 12, 1991, at 12 (questioning by Senator Arlen Specter).
109. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6, 16, 17, Phelps v. President & Trust-
ees of Colby College, 595 A.2d 403 (No. AND-90-511).
110. Letter to the editor from Sally Sutton, MCLU Executive Director, ME
TIMES, July 27, 1990, at 13.
111. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6-7, Phelps v. President & Trustees of
Colby College (No. AND-90-511).
112. Id. at 15-16, 32-33. The MCLU admitted that "the right of expressive associ-
ation is not absolute," and can be restricted in the face of "compelling state inter-
ests." Id. at 15. It conceded that eradicating discrimination was a compelling state
interest in cases requiring the Jaycees and Rotary clubs to admit women, noting that
adding women would not significantly diminish those organizations' expressive activi-
ties. Id. at 15-16.
113. Id. at 32-33 (footnote omitted). In revealing whose rights are presumed to be
the standard, the MCLU brief used "he" as the generic pronoun when talking gener-
ally about persons with rights under the Maine Civil Rights Act. See id. at 7. For
discussions of legal presumptions that particular persons are the standard for deter-
mining supposedly universal rights, see Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality
Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV
1118, 1152-59 (1986); CATHERINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED. DISCOURSES
ON LIFE AND LAW 32-45 (1987); Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101
HARV L REV. 10, 31-57 (1987).
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Legal publications commenting on the case similarly erased the
problem of fraternity violence from their reports on the case. A
Maine Bar Journal article summed up the fraternity case by saying
that Colby's decision to punish fraternity membership was compara-
ble to the college disciplining students for organizing an off-campus
art show.114 That article passed off as vague speculation Colby's ar-
gument that other students had First Amendment rights to attend
college and to associate in an environment free of any fraternities.'",
The Maine Lawyer's Review similarly analyzed the case under the
headline "Court Decision Gives College Powers to 'Police' and Pun-
ish Off-Campus Activities," without any mention of the reasons
Colby banned fraternities and without any mention of any on-cam-
pus problems relating to fraternities at Colby."" That article sum-
marized the question posed by the decision as follows: "How Colby
College could forcefully impress its regulations on allegedly constitu-
tionally protected off-campus associations and activities of its
students."11
Among a group of local progressive civil rights lawyers preparing
an amicus brief in the Colby fraternity case, the predominant con-
cern was that the Law Court would narrow the Maine Civil Rights
Act so that it would not protect against the "real" threats to civil
rights posed by private hate groups like the Klan and skinheads.
Their goal was to overcome the court's emotional reaction to the
description of the fraternities as silly, immature kids with a
penchant for tearing off chicken heads. These lawyers had no serious
concern that certain college fraternities could be a threat to civil
rights.118
C. Feeling Fundamental: The Thomas Hearings
A similarly selective emphasis on protecting privileged men's feel-
ings was excruciatingly evident in the Senate confirmation hearings
for Judge (now Associate Justice) Clarence Thomas. The public air-
ing of Professor Anita Hill's story, and the intensity of many
women's identification with her experiences, presented a major chal-
114. Patrick S. Bedard, Maine Civil Rights Act, 6 ME- BAR J 76, 84 (1991).
115. Id.
116. ME. LAWYER'S REvIEW, Oct.-Nov. 1991, at 13.
117. Id.
118. 1 don't mean to diminish the harms of racist groups, or to suggest that cer-
tain fraternities are necessarily as dangerous as groups that have a history of murder.
I believe the harms caused by certain skinheads and the Klan may have been more
perceptible to white, middle-class attorneys because the predominant stereotype is
that perpetrators of Klan and skinhead violence are working class and poor whites.
Progressive attorneys may have felt a greater sense of identity with groups of elite
liberal arts college men; fraternity members are much more likely than skinheads or
Klan members to hold positions of economic and social power in legal circles in
Maine.
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lenge to the dominant fiction that sexual oppression is abnor-
mal-not caused by apparently nice, well-educated, successful
men.""9 As in the Colby fraternity case, the strong emotional attach-
ments to this fiction were anxiously covered up by resorting to the
liberal ideology of neutral principles.
Sensational imagery magnified the harm to Thomas from the ac-
cusations' 20 while bizarre speculations and contortions of the evi-
119. On the other hand, it played into white racist stereotypes of black sexuality.
In one version of the attempt to defend this fiction, one op-ed writer agreed that
the sexual harassment charges brought against Clarence Thomas reflect everyday,
normal events, but went on to argue that it is elitist to interpret these events as
anything other than normal, pleasant human interaction.
[The Thomas hearings] also revealed one of [our system's] greatest weak-
nesses: there are serious misperceptions of what is really going on in our
society, and lamentable failure in our threadbare, predominantly liberal
discourse on it.
One revealing feature of these hearings is the startling realization that
Judge Clarence Thomas might well have said what Prof. Anita Hill alleges
and yet be the extraordinarily sensitive man his persuasive female defend.
ers claimed. American feminists have no way of explaining this.
Orlando Patterson, Race, Gender and Liberal Fallacies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1991, §
4, at 15. It is interesting that in the face of at least a decade of exhaustive explanation
by American feminists about the social and political processes that implicate "nor-
mal" men in sexual abuse, the New York Times continues to prefer writers lamenting
the same feminist silence that it routinely perpetuates. See Edward S. Herman The
"Best Man", Z MAO. 9, Oct. 1991 (on the New York Times' censorship of leftist and
feminist black scholars); MacKinnon, supra note 8, at 13 (on The New York Times'
censorship of her op-ed commentary on a sexual harassment case).
120. Mr. Chairman, something has happened to me in the dark days that
have followed since the F.B.I. agents informed me about these allegations.
And the days have grown darker as this very serious, very explosive, and
very sensitive allegation, or these sensitive allegations were selectively
leaked in a distorted way to the media over the past weekend.
I have never, in all my life, felt such hurt, such pain, such agony.
My family and I have been done a grave and irreparable injustice.
I have endured this ordeal for 103 days.
This is not American. This is Kafkaesque.
Mr. Chairman, I am a victim of this process. My name has been harmed.
My integrity has been harmed. My character has been harmed. My family
has been harmed. My friends have been harmed. There is nothing this com-
mittee, this body, or this country can do to give me my good name back.
Nothing.
I will not provide the rope for my own lynching, or for further
humiliation.
Judge Clarence Thomas, Opening Statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Supreme Court nomination hearings (Oct. 11, 1991) (reprinted in NY TIMES, Oct.
12, 1991, at 10).
If the accusations had been successful in defeating the nomination, Thomas would
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dence discounted and distanced the harm to Hill from any sexual
harassment."' The Thomas hearings, like the Colby case, suggest
that the fact that one position is called "principled" and another
"emotional" often has more to do with misogyny than with reason,
law, or ethics.
For example, in a speech explaining his vote to confirm Justice
Thomas, Maine's Senator William Cohen set himself off as a lonely
champion of lofty principle, in opposition to what he casts as the
emotional, fashionable position against Thomas. 2 ' Cohen began his
speech by insisting that he abhors sexual harassment. After this
showing of concern for women, he concluded that the issue was prin-
ciple, not the harm caused by sexual harassment:
But the Senate is not being asked to rule on the scope of sexual
harassment in America today.
. . . The central question has been how to resolve the issue of
doubt-in favor of Clarence Thomas or against him.
To resolve it in his favor immediately opens one to the charge of
callous disregard of an issue of immense importance to the women
of this country. To resolve it against him rejects a notion of funda-
mental fairness that the accuser bears the burden of proof in our
society.
... [T]he easy thing and the popular thing for me to do would be
to vote "no." History might show it might be the right thing to do.
Mr. President, I do not believe it is the fair thing to do under these
have been left with one of the more powerful legal positions in the country-D.C.
Circuit Court Judge. See PEOPLE MAG., Nov. 11, 1991, cover story for one example of
a dramatization of Justice Thomas's suffering and hurt feelings. For a view of the
Thomas statement as a narrative of divine crucifixion and resurrection, see Patricia J.
Williams, The Bread and Circus Literacy Test, Ms, Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 35-37.
121. For bizarre speculations, see Senator Arlen Specter's attempt to attribute
Hill's sexual harassment allegations against Thomas to mental instability by intro-
ducing an affidavit claiming that Hill had once made a statement to a man at a party
indicating she had believed the man might be romantically interested in her. Ex-
cerpts from Senate's Hearings on the Thomas Nominations, NY TatEs, Oct. 12.
1991, at 12, 14. Comments from members of the public on Anita Hill's testimony:.
"I suppose he did harass her a little bit," Ms. Nierling said, as the image of
Judge Thomas flickered across her television screen, his eyes welling with
tears. "I personally believe he probably did all of those things" she said.
"But they're making too big a deal out of it. It's not like he's been raping
women and beating children."
Dirk Johnson, Puzzled and Disgusted, But Fixated on Hearings, N Y TwuEs, Oct. 14.
1991, at A16. For an example of the possible harm to Hill resulting from her testi-
mony, see State Legislator Seeks Hill's Ouster, NY TIMEs, Oct. 16, 1991, at A21.
122. 137 CONG. REC. S14682-83 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1991) (statement of Sen. Cohen)
(copy sent to constituents who urged Cohen to vote against Thomas). Catharine
MacKinnon criticizes a similar technique in another context: "Cross-burning should
not be romanticized as a lonely and unheeded critique of a powerful status quo."
Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Black Women's Health Project in Support of
Respondent at 23, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, cert. granted, 111 S.Ct. 2795 (1991).
19921
MAINE LAW REVIEW
circumstances. For that reason, I intend to support his
nomination.'23
Cohen's speech constructs the Thomas vote as a choice between
an issue important "to women" on the one hand and, on the other
hand, "fundamental fairness." By opposing issues affecting women
with issues of fairness, Cohen makes the choice simple and the con-
clusion obvious. He assumes that the concern about sexual harass-
ment is an issue particular to women, rather than a universal, neu-
tral principle-fundamental fairness. Even more interesting is the
extent to which he takes this ideology of "neutral" principle: con-
cern about harm to women is not just "easy" and "popular" but the
opposite of justice itself. Cohen implies that the essence of funda-
mental fairness is the decision to reject concerns about protecting
women in favor of concerns about protecting men.124
While Republicans like Cohen asserted that their fears of harm to
accused male officials raise fundamental principles, Democratic lead-
ership reinforced support for Thomas by assuming that concerns
about the harms of official sexual harassment are fundamentally
personal. Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (Maine's other
Senator) voted against Thomas with an eloquent speech but "made
no effort to rally other Democrats to do the same." '125
In defending his lack of leadership on the vote, Mitchell explained
that "he believed the decision should be made individually and
should not be influenced by partisan politics."'2 In his view, the
Thomas vote was one that ought to be based "on the conscience and
judgment of each senator."'12 7 Mitchell treated the sexual harass-
ment allegations against Thomas as personal, not political; a matter
to be resolved by individual experience, not by principled
persuasion. 2"
123. 137 CONG. REC. S14682-83 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1991) (statement of Sen. Cohen)
(copy sent to constituents who urged Cohen to vote against Thomas).
124. In contrast to how the dichotomy between principle and emotion was used in
support of Justice Thomas, a woman's attempt to reject easy responses to immediate
emotional interests in favor of long-term goals was described in language suggesting
cold, selfish aloofness rather than lofty, admirable principles. In a lukewarm attempt
to consider the validity of Anita Hill's perspective, Cohen speculated that "she buried
Judge Thomas' offensive conduct deep within her soul and chose to maintain a
friendly relationship in order to protect and further her professional career." Id. at
S14682.
125. Steve Campbell, Mitchell's Lack of Lobbying Disappoints Women's Groups,
KENNEBEC JOURNAL, Oct. 15, 1991, at 4.
126. Id.
127. Id. Patricia J. Williams writes eloquently about how government officials
similarly use "privatization" of official responses to white racist violence to avoid
public responsibility. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 64.
128. Another current manifestation of the gendered nature of the "principled"
ideal is the concept of "NIMBY" (Not In My Backyard). "NIMBY" is used to de-
scribe environmental activism motivated by what is viewed as parochial personal in-
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Both the Colby case and the Thomas hearings show how the male-
biased perceptions that dominate legal and popular culture magnify
harm to privileged men and minimize harm to others. Applying
"neutral" principles to these biased perceptions means that the civil
rights of women and other traditionally subordinated groups will
tend to be overlooked or discounted when these threaten privileged
men's interests.12 In fact, the call to "principle" was used to en-
courage identification with privileged hurt and to block considera-
tion of harm to others.
VII. PRINCIPLED EXPERIENCES OF HARMFUL EXPRESSION
A. Tolerating Speech, Punishing Action
In the liberal refrain, tolerance for one means tolerance for all.'3
In this view, rights to free expression do not conflict with others'
rights. The theory is that any harm caused by hateful speech can be
remedied by more speech, serving as an opportunity for robust de-
bate and education as opposing views are aired.13' Defending frater-
nity members' right to associate was supposed to protect similar
terest rather than principled concern about the public welfare. See Orlando Delogu,
"Nimby" is a National Environmental Problem, 35 SD L REv 198-219 (1990). In
her discussion of the connections between devaluation of women and nature in domi-
nant American culture, Anne Simon notes that much locally based environmental
organizing against toxic waste dumps (often referred to as examples of NIMBYism) is
led by women. Anne E. Simon, Whose Move? Breaking the Stalemate in Feminist
and Environmental Activism, 2 U.C.L.A WOMENI's LJ 145 (forthcoming 1992) (man-
uscript at 160 n.55, on file with author). As Simon suggests, in a culture that tradi-
tionally trivializes the broad public value of women's work in the home, the house-
keeping image invoked by the term "NIMBY" (keeping backyards clean) may
similarly serve to trivialize the public value of local efforts to fight environmental
pollution.
A cartoon about Maine's budget crisis contained a graphic illustration of the
gendered connotations of the NIMBY epithet in another context. The cartoon
showed a group of men sitting around a table in a room marked "Budget Commit-
tee." The one female figure at the table was marked by the label "NIMBY," and the
caption read, "Just mention cuts in state services and watch her go into action."
Locke, Cartoon, ME. SUNDAY TELEGRAM, Nov. 17, 1991, at 6C.
129. For an analysis of how civil rights laws have had more effect on blue collar
employment than on professional middle- or upper-class jobs, see Elizabeth
Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARv L REV 947
(1982).
130. The Kantian categorical imperative, Western philosophy's archetypal univer-
sal principle, asserts that we should choose ethical rules that can be consistently and
neutrally applied to all, regardless of personal preference or experience; in other
words, we must choose rules that treat other "rational beings" as autonomous, rule-
making ends in themselves, rather than merely as means to our ends. See IMMANUEL
KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Lewis W. Beck trans., 1959).
131. "In the context of countering racism on campus, the strategy of increasing
speech-rather than decreasing it-not only would be consistent with first amend-
ment principles, but also would be more effective in advancing equality goals." Stros-
sen, A Modest Proposal?, supra note 71, at 562.
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rights of African-American student groups, or lesbian and gay stu-
dent groups.1 3' Prohibitions on violent or threatening behavior from
hate groups like the Klan are supposed to sufficiently protect the
rights of victims of these hate groups.'33
When the Colby administration asked students' opinions on
whether the Lambda Chi members should be punished for fraternity
membership, a number of students asserted a right to choose to as-
sociate in a college with no fraternities, a right which they believed
conflicted with the right to belong to Lambda Chi.'3  One student
wrote:
As a woman of the Class of 1990 I am extremely bothered by the
continued existence and activity of these illegal organizations. I
chose to attend Colby four years ago in part because of the decision
to ban fraternities from this campus. I did not want to enter a so-
cial and academic atmosphere dominated by discriminatory and
frequently obnoxious organizations.1 35
In the civil libertarian view, those who assert conflicting interests
in associating without fraternities, based on concerns about harm
caused by fraternities, are confusing speech and action. According to
the MCLU, the students who oppose fraternities will not be signifi-
cantly harmed by the mere existence of fraternities-only by frater-
nity behavior, which the college would remain free to punish. The
MCLU explained that if it protects male students' right to join fra-
ternities, "Colby may continue to advertise its anti-fraternity philos-
ophy and attract students who wish to attend a college espousing
this philosophy.""'3
The MCLU's Brief assures us that the fraternity's "associational
activities" which the college wishes to ban "are harmless and can be
132. See Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, at 1 n.1, Phelps v. President &
Trustees of Colby College, 595 A.2d 403 (No. AND-90-511). And in Senator Cohen's
version of the Thomas hearings, presumably we are supposed to expect that the de-
fense of the accused's right to be confirmed to the nation's highest court unless
proven unfit beyond a reasonable doubt will similarly protect the rights of women to
be presumed fit for the jobs we seek unless proven otherwise beyond a reasonable
doubt.
133. "Those who share the dual goals of promoting racial equality and protecting
free speech must concentrate on countering racial discrimination, rather than on de-
fining the particular narrow subset of racist slurs that constitutionally might be regul-
able." Strossen, A Modest Proposal?, supra note 71, at 550.
134. Most Letters to President Cotter Urge College to Take a Firm Stand, COLBY
CURRENTS, Summer 1990, at 6-7.
135. Id. at 6. Excerpts from statements submitted by other students similarly em-
phasize that this choice to associate in a college without fraternities was not a trivial
concern: "One of my reasons for coming to Colby is because I was told that there
were not fraternities here. As I have found out, that is a lie .... I wouldn't have
come here had I known about the fraternities." Id.
136. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, at 32, Phelps v. President & Trustees of
Colby College, 595 A.2d 403 (No. AND-90-511).
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separated easily from other activities, such as hazing, harassment, or
alcohol abuse, which may be harmful to others.' 3 7 "[The Lambda
Chis'] crime seems to have been simply that they formed their own
organization with a Greek name. So the MCLU is not defending any
action the students took, but their constitutional right to freedom of
association-one of the most fundamental rights that Americans
enjoy.M38
But the reliance on neutral principles to separate "mere associa-
tion" from behavior ignores that the concepts of speech and behav-
ior, and the line between the two, are socially constructed. Actions
can be expressive; expression can have actual impact. Which side of
the line is called speech and which is called action necessarily de-
pends on experiential judgments about reality, not just logical de-
ductions from principles. And the staunchest defenders of absolute
speech rights are as likely as any others to privilege their own per-
ceptions of whose speech is an absolute right of expression and
whose speech can be restricted as harmful action.
B. Speaking of Oppressive Action
The line between speech and action is the subject of current de-
bate in a case to be decided this year by the U.S. Supreme Court. In
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,3" a white youth was prosecuted under a
local bias crime law for allegedly burning a cross one night in the
yard of a black family two weeks after it moved into the previously
all-white neighborhood.1 4 0 The ACLU argued that the First Amend-
ment prohibits St. Paul's ordinance banning cross burning and simi-
lar symbols known to arouse "anger, alarm or resentment in others
on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender . . ". ' The
ACLU acknowledged that the First Amendment does not protect all
symbolic expressions of hate, but it argued that this ordinance
should be overturned and rewritten-not simply narrowly
construed.142'
137. Brief Amicus Curiae of Maine Civil Liberties Union at 4-5, Phelps v. Presi-
dent & Trustees of Colby College, 595 A.2d 403 (No. AND-90-511).
138. Letter to the editor from Sally Sutton, MCLU Executive Director, ME
TIEs, July 27, 1990, at 13.
139. In re R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991), cert. granted sub noma. R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 111 S. Ct 2795 (1991). This case was decided June 22, 1992. The
ordinance was held facially invalid under the First Amendment. 60 U.S.L.W. 4667
(U.S. June 23, 1992).
140. Tamar Lewin, Cross-burning Case Tests Minnesota Hate Crime Law. ME
SUNDAY TELEGRAM, Dec. 1, 1991, at 1, 16A.
141. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union, In re R.A.V.. 464
N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991), cert. granted sub nom. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Ill S.
Ct. 2795 (1991). See ST. PAUL. MINN., LEGISLATIVE CODE AND ADMINISTRATIVE CODE,
ch. 292, § 292.02 (1990).
142. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union, In re R.A.V.,
464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991), cert. granted sub noam. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul. 111
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Counsel for the youth condemned the ordinance as a misguided
attempt to "legislate social tolerance" and "enforce a notion of civil-
ity to the point of forbidding unpopular minority expression.' 43 In
contrast, groups supporting the ordinance argued that "[n]either the
purpose nor the effect of cross burning is to engage in lively debate:
it is and has been to terrorize, to intimidate and to spark violence,
even murder."144 "Not all disruptive or controversial speech .. . is
steeped in [a] centuries-long tradition of violent attacks.' 4
In an amicus brief on behalf of the National Black Women's
Health Project, Catharine MacKinnon notes case law recognizing
the active harm caused by symbolic expression in the context of race
discrimination. 4" She argues that cross burnings, like signs that say
"whites only," are impermissible action-not protected speech.' 47
"Cowering in terror at night with your family on the floor of your
own home in the light of a terrorist cross burning on your lawn is
surely a deprivation of personal dignity equal to not being permitted
to stay overnight in a motel on the road."'
48
S. Ct. 2795 (1991).
143. Brief for Petitioner, In re R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991), cert.
granted sub noma. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 111 S. Ct. 2795 (1991), available in
LEXIS, at 16, 22.
144. Brief Amicis Curiae in Support of Respondent Submitted by the Center for
Democratic Renewal, The Center for Constitutional Rights, the National Conference
of Black Lawyers, the National Council of La Raza, the International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America-UAW, The
Young Women's Christian Association of the U.S.A., the National Organization of
Black Law Enforcement Executives, the National Lawyers Guild, the United Church
of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, the National Institute Against Prejudice and
Violence, the Greater Boston Civil Rights Coalition and the National Coalition of
Black Lesbians and Gays at 29-30, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 111 S. Ct. 2795 (1991)
(No. 90-7675)) [hereinafter CCR Amicus Brief].
145. Id. at 41.
It is a manifest distortion of reality to claim there is an undifferentiated
slippery slope leading from the midnight cross burning trespasser, to the
speaker on communism or lesbian rights who offends and angers those who
oppose those views. Only the former acts, within a contextual history of
violent attack, to subject a group of people to terror and utilizes a symbol
which has been the prelude to widespread and severe violence.
Id. at 41-42.
146. Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Black Women's Health Project in Sup-
port of Respondent at 16, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 111 S. Ct. 2795 (1991) (No. 90-
7675).
147. Id. at 21. "A crossburning is not a dialogue, it is a discriminatory act," de-
spite its "expressive" message. Id. at 21. "IT]he harm of segregation and other racist
practices is at least as much what it says as what it does, just as with crossburning,
what it says is indistinguishable from what it does." Id. at 16.
148. Id. at 9. MacKinnon argues that
the practices prohibited by [the ordinance] form integral links in systematic
social discrimination. They work to keep target groups in socially isolated,
stigmatized and disadvantaged positions through the promotion of fear, in-
tolerance, segregation, exclusion, disparagement, vilification, degradation,
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Established law has recognized harm from expression in a number
of contexts without protest from defenders of civil liberties."" In-
timidation by threats of physical violence is not protected by the
First Amendment.1 50 Even the harmful impact of "mere association"
is now well-established in race and sex discrimination cases.'1'
Brown v. Board of Education 52 established that the harm of seg-
regation was not simply the act of separating children by race, but
the message-black inferiority-expressed by this form of associa-
tion viewed in the existing social context.'5 3 Yet at the time of
Brown, prominent legal scholar Herbert Wechsler believed that de-
cision's ban on racially segregated schools could not be defended by
neutral principles. 54 Such a position is a logical extension of an "ab-
solute" defense of freedom of association rights. Like the Maine
court in the Colby case, Wechsler found no way to resolve what he
perceived to be an agonizing constitutional puzzle between associa-
tional rights: whites' free association right to associate in schools
without blacks, versus others' right to associate in integrated
schools. 55 Wechsler recognized that Brown's result required the
violence, and genocide. The harms range from immediate psychic wounding
and attack. . . to well-documented consequent physical aggression. . . . As
terrorist acts of social subordination, they effectuate inequality through co-
ercion, intimidation and harassment.
Id. at 12 (citations omitted). MacKinnon observes, "Living in a state of siege is not
conducive to health." Id. at 3.
149. For example, the ACLU urged denial of tax benefits to racially discrimina-
tory educational institutions against the University's First Amendment claims in a
brief amicus curiae in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). See
Strossen, A Modest Proposal?, supra note 71, at 546-47.
150. Laws such as the St. Paul ordinance "cannot be said to 'legislate social intol-
erance' unless criminal statutes can be said to be similarly 'intolerant' of violence,
assault, and murder." CCR Amicus Brief at 40, .A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 111 S. Ct.
2795 (1991) (No. 90-7675). Speech can be restricted because of other harms, as well:
for example, the law recognizes the harmful effects of child pornography, New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); and of sexual and racial harassment, Robinson v. Jack-
sonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Vietnamese Fishermen's
Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp. 198, 219-20 (S.D. Tex. 19821: Lac
du Flambeau Indians v. Stop Treaty Abuse-Wis., 759 F. Supp. 1339, 1349, 1353 (W.D.
Wis. 1991); State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547, 553 (Ga. 1990).
151. Compare Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) uith Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
152. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
153. See Penelope Seator, Judicial Indifference to Pornography s Harm Ameri-
can Booksellers v. Hudnut, 17 GOLDEN GATE U L Rav 297, 318 (1987).
154. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional LalL. 73
HARV. L. REv. 1, 34 (1959).
155. Given a situation where the state must praltically choose between deny.
ing the association to those individuals who wish it or imposing it on those
who would avoid it, is there a basis in neutral principles for holding that
the Constitution demands that the claims for association should prevail? I
should like to think there is, but I confess that I have not yet written the
opinion.
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Court to choose among rights based on perceptions and judgments
about contextual, social impacts.
In contemporary legal circles, Wechsler's agony over Brown "now
appears quite odd."' 58 And the predominant civil libertarian view
holds that the compelling interest in ending discrimination out-
weighs any conflicting First Amendment rights.1 57 But the MCLU
found no such compelling conflicting interest justifying Colby's ban
on fraternity membership.
C. Fraternity Membership in Context
The question the MCLU asked in the Colby case was whether the
"mere association" of Colby students as the Lambda Chi fraternity
had an impact on others' rights sufficient to justify limits on the
Lambda Chis' freedom of association. The MCLU used this question
as an obvious end to the discussion. The MCLU assumed that any
intimidation, harassment, and violence by Lambda Chi members
was separable from membership in the group itself; presumably,
such problems could not be a systemic and inherent characteristic of
a predominantly white group of college men.
A more principled approach would have made the question the
beginning of a careful exploration of the effects of Lambda Chi
membership. 158 Just as some symbolic cross burnings constitute
harmful action in the social context of white terrorism, some college
fraternities can take on characteristics of harmful action in the so-
cial context of male violence in general, and fraternity violence in
particular. Fraternities like Lambda Chi do not have a history of
violence comparable to that of some white supremacist groups. But
a credible claim can be made that a fraternity such as Lambda Chi
is a group with a central purpose of fostering misogyny, and an ac-
tual practice of harassing and terrorizing women and other students.
Such a group is particularly threatening in a social context of perva-
sive violence against women.
Violence against women by well-educated men is a common real-
ity in the United States-not a far-fetched speculation or philosoph-
ical opinion. 159 One out of every four college women will be sexually
Id.
156. Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DuKE LJ
589, 618.
157. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 15-16, Phelps v. President & Trustees
of Colby College (No. AND-90-511).
158. Ann Scales urges us to challenge "conversation-stopping arguments" by mak-
ing these "the beginning rather than the end of discussion." Ann Scales, Feminist
Legal Method: Not So Scary, 2 U.C.L.A. WOMEN's LJ. 1 (forthcoming 1992) (manu-
script at 13, on file with author).
159. One study of college students reported that nearly half of over three thou-
sand women surveyed had experienced some form of sexual coercion since the age of
fourteen. SANDAY, supra note 42, at 23 (citing Mary P. Koss et al., The Scope of
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assaulted on a college campus; 80% of these campus attackers are
fellow students, and "the most likely location of the attack will be a
dormitory room or a fraternity house. 1 60 One study reported that
about 35% of college men said they would commit a rape if they
knew there was no chance of being caught."'
6
'
Moreover, sexual assault by college men occurs in a larger social
context of pervasive violence against women in the United States.
Battering by violent partners is the single major reason for emer-
gency medical treatment for women in the United States.' 2 Every
7.4 seconds, a woman in the United States is beaten by her male
partner; every 6 minutes a woman is raped. 1 3 Research about crimes
Rape: Incidence and Prevalence of Sexual Aggression and Victimization in a Na-
tional Sample of Higher Education Students, 55 J OF CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSY'CH
162-70 (1987)). See also Jane Caputi & Diana E.H. Russell, "Femicide" Speaking
the Unspeakable, Ms., Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 34. WARSHAW, supra note 81. at 64 (41% of
raped women expect to be raped again) (citing Ms Foundation survey by Mary Koss
of acquaintance rape at United States colleges in 1985).
Sexual harassment of women on United States campuses is commonplace: at sev-
eral campuses that have studied the problem, the majority of women surveyed re-
ported experiencing some form of sexual harassment. See Jean O'Gorman Hughes &
Bernice R. Sandler, Peer Harassment, Hassles for Women on Campus, 2 (Sept. 1988)
(report issued by the Project on the Status and Education of Women, available from
Center for Women Policy Studies, 2000 P St., NW, Suite 508, Washington. D.C.
20036).
160. Kathleen Hirsch, Fraternities of Fear: Gang Rape, Male Bonding, and the
Silencing of Women, Ms., Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 52; WARSHAW, supra note 81, at 2. For a
summary of a number of studies showing substantial levels of violence against women
by college men in the U.S., see WARSHAW, supra note 81, at 13-14.
161. Neil M. Malamuth, Rape Proclivity Among Males, 37 J. OF Soc IssuEs 138
(1981).
Another study of college men indicated that 15% had sexual intercourse with a
woman against her wishes, and more than 50% had sexually touched a woman against
her wishes. WARSHAW, supra note 81, at 96-97 (citing Karen Rapaport & Barry R.
Burkhart, Personality and Attitudinal Characteristics of Sexually Coercive College
Males, 93 J. OF ABNORMAL PSYCH. 216 (1984)). In another study, more than 60% of
undergraduate men agreed that "it would be exciting to use force to subdue a wo-
man." WARSHAW, supra note 81, at 93 (citing Virginia Greendlinger & Donna Byrne.
Coercive Sexual Fantasies of College Men as Predictors of Self-Reported Likelihood
to Rape and Overt Sexual Aggression, 23 J. OF SEX REs. 1. 5 (1987)).
162. Michele Lang, Professionals, Activists, Crows: The Family Violence Program
at Boston University School of Medicine (Notes From the Field), 14 HARY WOMNSs
L.J. 222, 224 (1991) (Center for Disease Control, 1985). "Battering is the cause of 50%
of the injuries brought to hospital emergency rooms." Id. at 224 n.7 (citing Evan
Stark et al., Wife Abuse in the Medical Setting: An Introduction for Health Person-
nel, DoMESTic VIOLENCE MONOGRAPH SERIES No. 7., (National Clearinghouse on Do-
mestic Violence 1981)). Nonetheless, one study of a metropolitan emergency depart-
ment found that only 5% of battered women seeking emergency services were
identified as such in physicians' reports. Wendy G. Goldberg & Michael C. Tomla-
novich, Domestic Violence Victims in the Energency Department: Neu, Findings,
251 J. OF AM. MED. Assoc. 3259, 3263 (1984).
163. Lang, supra note 162, at 223 (citing Susan V. McLeer, M.D., Spouse Abuse,
THE HANDBOOK OF MARITAL THERAPY (1981)). Another report presents slightly differ-
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against women demonstrates that "we live in the midst of a reign of
sexist terror.' 12
6 4
The presumption that harmful individual actions can be neatly
separated from associational expression rests on an individualistic
view of the world that minimizes the role of social institutions (like
fraternities) in shaping individual behavior. White male violence is
not merely an accident of individual pathology. Studies of rapists
and mass murderers indicate that many of these perpetrators fit
common images of "regular guys." '''
The denial of the systematic, political nature of privileged male
violence is part of the structure that perpetuates such violence.' 0
By focusing the problem on individual misbehavior, the need for in-
stitutional changes is obscured and individual women are more
likely to bear the primary burden of stopping the violence. The diffi-
culties individual women face in reporting and redressing systematic
male violence are compounded not only by outright terrorism' 7 but
also by the dominant presumption that white male violence is an
inexplicable individual aberration,'0 " while women's reports of such
ent, although equally horrifying statistics: every 18 seconds, a woman is beaten, and
every 3 "2 minutes, a woman is the victim of rape or attempted rape. Women, Vio-
lence and the Law: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Children, Youth and
Families, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1987).
164. Caputi & Russell, supra note 159, at 37.
165. WARSHAW, supra note 81, at 86 (citing study of self-disclosed rapists by Eu-
gene Kanin, Date Rape: Unofficial Criminals and Victims, 9 VICTINIOLOGY; AN INT'L
J. 95, 98 (1984)). See also David Moberg, The Michigan Post Office Killings Were a
Tragedy Waiting to Happen, IN THESE TIMEs, Nov. 27-Dec. 10, 1991, at 9 (quoting
Northeastern University criminologist James A. Fox, an expert on mass murders, dis-
cussing difficulty of screening for mass murderers because many people fit the profile
of the typical mass murderer).
166. When Marc Lepine murdered 14 women at the University of Montreal in
1989 he separated the women from the men in one classroom and shouted, "You're all
fucking feminists" as he opened fire; nonetheless, media reports frequently denied the
political nature of the murders. Caputi & Russell, supra note 159, at 34. In a more
recent mass murder, women were reportedly singled out; the murderer had written a
note describing his anger at the "abundance of evil women," saying, "I will no matter
what prevail over the female vipers in those two rinky-dink towns in Texas." Tom
Squitieri & Debbie Howlett, Women Were 'Singled Out' in Rampage, USA TODAY,
Oct. 18-20, 1991, at 1A, 2A. But as with the Montreal murder, many media reports
erased or downplayed the misogynist motivation for the Texas mass murder. See, e.g.,
Don Terry, Texans Call Killer a Troubled Loner, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Oct. 18,
1991, at 1.
167. A number of studies suggest that battered women risk facing increased vio-
lence from abusive partners when they attempt to leave abusive relationships. Na-
tional Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women, Statistics on Separation
Violence (Summer 1991 Draft).
168. Comments on the recently publicized Dahmer sex murders demonstrate this
mystification of white male violence. A Newsweek article reporting on the case cites
criminologists studying serial killings in the United States; "Over the years, it's be-
come clear that most offenders are white males, but there are no real theories as to
why that is so." The Secrets of Apt. 213: A Gruesome Find in Milwaukee Spotlights
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violence are an archetypal pattern of feminine fantasy. '
D. Lambda Chi's Expressive Tradition
As a Colby student, I got the message of Lambda Chi's expressive
activity loud and clear: women should be subordinate to men, and
men should enforce our subordination with violence. The exper-
iences of those victimized by privileged male violence suggest the
difficulties in separating harm caused by individual behavior from
harm caused by the "mere expression" of fraternity participation.
For groups who associate for oppressive purposes in a context of
societal power, the act of association itself can work to threaten and
control others in order to prevent the identification and punishment
of harmful actions. 7 ' One study found that some fraternities sys-
tematically used their organizations to protect members from law
enforcement investigations and from university disciplinary
action.1 71
At the time of the college's decision to punish Lambda Chi mem-
bers, students wrote to Colby officials that their fear of fraternity
retribution prevented them from reporting fraternity-related
problems on campus. From a senior man in April, 1990:
Fraternal activity at Colby is a form of perpetual social assault. I
have had to deal with men, crying, exhausted, broken and confused
the Bizarre World of Serial Killers, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 4, 1991, 40, 41.
169. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. MASSON, THE ASSAULT ON TstLTH FREUD'S SUPPRESSION
OF THE SEDUCTION THEORY (1984) (basis of modern psychological theory is Freud's
decision to attribute women's accounts of sexual abuse to fantasy rather than reality).
Some recent examples of women's accounts of sexual abuse which have been attrib-
uted to individual fantasy or psychopathology include Anita Hill's testimony in the
nomination hearings of Justice Clarence Thomas, and the victim's testimony in the
widely publicized William Kennedy Smith rape trial. See also Patricia J. Williams'
discussion of the Tawana Brawley case, supra note 89.
170. One student explained that fraternity control of the student disciplinary
board prevented punishment of individual misbehavior by fraternity brothers. COLBY
CURRENTS, Summer 1990, at 6.
I served on the Judicial Board my sophomore year and was incredibly frus-
trated by the fact that the board was infiltrated with fraternity members.
and that whenever fraternity members came before the board. justice was
never obtained .... As a first-year student, I resided in ... the dormitory
in which most of the Lambda Chi members resided. I found it an extremely
unpleasant living experience as they were sexist, intimidating and amaz-
ingly self-centered .... Diplomacy has not worked, and I strongly feel that
unequivocal action is necessitated. I would like to see all of the members of
Lambda Chi expelled.
Id.
171. Martin & Hummer, supra note 75, at 457. This study found "numerous ex-
amples" of fraternity brothers lying to authorities to protect brothers. Id. at 464. In
one 1988 fraternity house gang rape where a female student came close to being
killed, all but one member of the fraternity held rank to thwart a criminal investiga-
tion. Id. at 459, 464.
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who were afraid to continue with the fraternity, but more afraid to
speak out against their 'brothers.' Threats against their person are
both made and implied. Rooms are entered and thrown in disarray.
Pledges are ordered out into the middle of the night to perform
duties, chores or exercises. Social discrimination and humiliation
are the norm. Women are also abused, denigrated and discrimi-
nated against.
17 2
From another April, 1990 student letter urging Colby's President
Cotter to punish Lambda Chi membership: "The campus has lived
under fear of retribution for six years. No one says anything because
if you as the administration don't do your job [following through on
the promise made to ban fraternities], we are the ones who live with
the consequences. 11' 7 From a dorm president: "[T]he student body
as a whole is intimidated by them. (Last weekend) there were liter-
ally packs of drunk, belligerent [Lambda Chi Alphas] running
around the campus looking for trouble. 1 7 4 From another student
letter to Colby's President Cotter urging him to punish fraternity
membership: "[D]uring my sophomore year, I saw two of my neigh-
bors harassed because they refused to join the fraternity of which
many of their teammates were a part.'1 5 A senior Colby student
who worked as the head staffperson of one dorm explained her ex-
periences with the supposedly "off-campus" activities of Lambda
Chis (who, the MCLU claimed, were forced "to associate in secret
out of fear" in the spring semester of 1990):'1
I am unable to express in this letter the frustration, anger and bit-
terness of [the dorm residents] as a result of LCA activities....
[T]hey ran up and down the halls and stairwells, screaming,
pounding doors, showing no respect for myself or my staff in our
attempts to quiet them down at [sic] from eleven at night until
three or four in the morning which is when most pledging activity
occurred.. . . [P]art of my job is to watch out for the well being of
all [residents of her dormitory] . . .I was powerless to do anything
about [the disturbances caused by Lambda Chi pledging] .... I
was told I could come forward with names but the fear which ex-
isted with those who would have had to testify was so great that
they refused to come forward. '77
The fear of speaking out against fraternity-related problems is not
unusual-or irrational. In her study of fraternity gang rapes, Peggy
172. Colby and Fraternities: Where We Stand (August 1990), supra note 33, at 7-
8.
173. COLBY CURRENTS, Apr. 1990, at 6.
174. Colby and Fraternities: Where We Stand (August 1990), supra note 33, at 8.
175. COLBY CURRENTS, supra note 173, at 7.
176. See Plaintiffs' Trial Brief, Phelps v. President & Trustees of Colby College,
595 A.2d 403 (No. CV-90-287), at 23.
177. Trial Record, Phelps v. President & Trustees of Colby College, No. CV-90-
287 (Me. Super. Ct., Curi. Cty., Aug. 22, 1990). Defendant's Exhibit 6.
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Reeves Sanday found that fraternities used harassment, intimida-
tion, and even death threats against students who spoke out publicly
against particular incidents of fraternity violence. 76 For example, a
Colgate faculty member said that threats against those who publicly
report fraternity violence there are "not uncommon": "One woman
[at Colgate] got a rock thrown through her window."'17 9
Public criticism of Colby fraternities sparked personal harassment
and threats by fraternities, not just lively discussion.' ° One example
of the kind of event that made many Colby students afraid to speak
out against fraternity violence occurred in 1983 when I was an
alumna living near Colby. The college had disciplined several Colby
fraternity brothers who confessed to an incident of sexual "miscon-
duct" involving a young girl from the local town.'8 ' The college took
no stand against fraternity membership at that time, and even took
pains to keep the punishment from appearing to be a condemnation
of fraternities in general.
After the college imposed the discipline, a large poster appeared
on the entrance of the brothers' fraternity house announcing death
wishes for the college officials who had punished the students. The
poster, which claimed to speak for the fraternity as a whole, further
informed the college community that if it ever were to find out who
178. SANDAY, supra note 42, at 126.
179. Id. Prosecuting gang violence or harassment by organized groups such as fra-
ternity members is difficult particularly because of the associational nature of the
actions. "The 'bonds of brotherhood' dictate that even group members who regret the
episode will support the group version of what happened when questioned by authori-
ties. 'One of the ironies of group acquaintance rape is that the defense Witnesses out-
number the complainant-victim.'" WARSHAW, supra note 81, at 103 (quoting Jerome
H. Skolnick, a professor of law at the University of California at Berkeley).
180. In the early 1980s, one student who had participated in a group supporting
the ban on fraternities, and who had published student newspaper articles discussing
the issue, was subjected to fraternity men yelling her name along with remarks such
as "show us your tits" when she walked by the Lambda Chi house.
181. According to the college's report of the incident, a gang of brothers looked on
while one of the brothers had sex with a girl, possibly as young as 15, in an upstairs
room of his fraternity house. The college called this incident "misconduct," not
"rape" or "assault," because the college determined that the girl had consented to
having sex. Telephone Conversation with Edward Hershey, Director of Communica-
tions, Colby College (Aug. 28, 1990) (information based on search of college records).
It is not clear how the college determined that this "consent" was not coerced, given
the young woman's situation, nor exactly how much of what went on she had fully
consented to.
Four brothers were found guilty of breaking college disciplinary rules; one was sus-
pended for a semester, one was suspended for a shorter period, and two were placed
on "probation." Id. The fraternity house to which the brothers belonged was placed
on "social probation" for the rest of the school year. Id. The college's "Fraternity
Guidelines" (instituted in 1981 as an attempt to improve problems relating to frater-
nities) define social probation as a sanction that prohibits fraternities from official
sponsorship of campus social events. Fraternity Guidelines- Will They Work?, THF
COLBY ALUMNUS, Fall 1981, at 13, 15.
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reported the incident, the brothers would "stab them with an
icepick."' 82
It would take considerable imagination to argue that protecting
such expression will ensure that victims of fraternity violence are
free to express their conflicting ideas. In addition to the use of vio-
lence and harassment against others who disagree with their associa-
tive values, the degree of internal intimidation and coercion that
certain college fraternities exercise over members distinguishes these
groups from many other associations. It appears that some Colby
fraternities, including Lambda Chi, enforced what could be consid-
ered a form of simulated slavery on pledges, giving fraternities a
particularly powerful organizational advantage over other groups on
campus.'83
The choice of certain Colby men to associate as "Lambda Chis" is
apparently made with an eye to the particular impact of that group
identity. If the students' purpose in belonging to Lambda Chi and
other exclusively male Greek organizations was merely to create an
intimate family-like group of like-minded, same-gendered friends
(as the MCLU argued) or even to devalue women and to encourage
excessive drinking and displays of heterosexual prowess, they would
be free to do so simply by calling their group by a new name and by
separating it from any identification with the pledging and hazing
activities that characterized the groups as fraternities. 84 That they
182. The poster was copied in a leaflet distributed in response to the incident by
an anonymous group of students (writing that they were too afraid to sign their
names), urging the college to take steps to prevent such incidents by sponsoring edu-
cational programs on sexual "misconduct." The full text of the poster reads:
We, the brothers of Tau Delta Phi, in the year nineteen hundred and
Eighty Three Do hereby promise, that we will do our best to get drunk,
cause as much trouble as possible, and basically make life for the 1700
other Fuckwads on this campus as miserable as possible. We will pray
nightly that Janice [Dean of Students] will die of a painful vaginal disease,
that our prudential committee will become paralyzed from the waist down,
and that Earl Smith [Dean of the College] will get aids, 2 strokes and V.D.
at the same time. And if we ever find out who went to Janice, we will stab
them with an icepick.
Leaflet (with photocopy of poster, on file with author).
183. A common feature of some fraternity rituals appears to involve brothers or-
dering pledges to perform laborious, demeaning (and occasionally illegal) tasks for
them, and to endure physical and psychological abuse. See Trial Record, Phelps, De-
fendant's Exhibit 6 (letter from dormitory staffperson explaining hazing activity she
observed disrupting other students); Hokanson, supra note 31, at 18 (discussing how
"slave labor" from pledges gave fraternities advantages in organizing campus social
events). Although slavery is a form of association, few, if any, civil libertarians would
argue that private persons have a free association right to "choose" to use slavery.
184. In fact, Colby's sororities seem to have disbanded at the time of the ban on
Greek organizations because other campus groups, or new sorority-like gatherings,
served their purposes equally well. See Hokanson, supra note 31, at 8-9. A name
change alone would not have sufficed to distance the group from the policy against
fraternity membership if the group used other means to identify itself with the for-
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did not choose to do so suggests that the mere act of calling them-
selves Lambda Chis had an impact beyond the male friendship and
masculinist ideas the members may have wished to express. '
Indeed, Colby has not banned all-male groups, groups that wish to
celebrate masculinity, nor groups that wish to discuss any of the
particular political ideas held by Lambda Chis. Lambda Chi mem-
bers are free to speak and associate as much as they want; Colby has
simply banned their association as Lambda Chis. And this distinc-
tion on Colby's part has some rational basis: the link of current
Lambda Chi members with the group's history of hazing, harass-
ment, intimidation, and possible violence on campus is arguably
what makes it particularly threatening to other students who wish to
express opposing views.
A close look at the experiences of students at Colby, in the con-
text of violence against women in the U.S., suggests that the mere
act of belonging to Lambda Chi at Colby could be an act that serves
to threaten others and severely impair their college education. Some
students felt forced to move off campus because of fraternity harass-
ment at Colby; a few may have dropped out of school altogether.' 0
It is likely that many more withdrew socially, emotionally, and aca-
demically from college life.
Critics of Colby's position in the fraternity case argue correctly
that Colby probably could have done a better job of seeking out and
punishing individual incidents of violence and harassment by frater-
nity members over the years. But cross burnings also might not have
developed into a threatening act in a society that had a better his-
tory of preventing and punishing racist violence.
It is true that harassment, rape, vandalism, gay-bashing, destruc-
tive drinking and other problems will probably exist at Colby with-
mer Greek-letter organization. See id., supra note 31, at 20 (difficulty of distinguish-
ing sports teams from fraternities). My argument is that this identity with the frater-
nities is what has a particularly harmful impact.
185. In addition to any impact resulting from identification with a reputation for
possible hazing and harassment, another possible impact of the Lambda Chi name is
financial-job contacts, alumni support, national legal backing.
186. 1 moved off campus in large part to avoid fraternity harassment. One male
student on my first-year dormitory hall, from a rural area of Maine, was harassed by
the fraternity pledges in my dorm; he did not pledge a fraternity and did not join in
the dormitory pledging activities. He left school shortly after the Lambda Chi and
KDR pledges moved his possessions into the hallway and barricaded him out of the
room he shared with one of the pledges. To my knowledge (and regret) none of the
rest of us on the hallway discussed this incident with college authorities. I have heard
rumors of women at Colby who allegedly dropped out of college after being sexually
assaulted or harassed by fraternity members.
A Colgate University student who pressed charges against two fraternity brothers
for gang raping her in 1987 at a fraternity party left school for a time after being
harassed by angry fraternity members. Hirsch, supra note 160, at 52, 55.
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out Lambda Chi and other fraternities. s18 However, it also is proba-
ble that certain formally organized fraternities such as Lambda Chi
directly affect the freedom of women and other non-fraternity mem-
bers to associate safely and equally in the college community. A
study of sexual assault at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Cham-
paign found that fraternity men, who constituted one quarter of the
male student population, perpetrated 63% of sexual assaults on
campus.' A 1985 study by the Association of American Colleges'
Project on the Status and Education of Women found more than 50
reported gang rapes on U.S. campuses, most of which occurred at
fraternity parties, and determined that far more went unreported. 89
Even though it could be true that these fraternities disproportion-
ately attract men who are otherwise disposed to violence, many fra-
ternities explicitly develop or exacerbate sexually violent tendencies
in men who might not engage in such actions without such formally
organized peer encouragement.'"0 One fraternity brother accused of
187. Bates College, another small liberal arts college in Maine, does not have fra-
ternities, but is by no means free from such problems. See, e.g., Phyllis Austin, Bates'
Handling of Rape Charges Draws Criticism, ME. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1992, at 11.
188. Hirsch, supra note 160 at 52.
189. WARSHAW, supra note 81, at 105 (citing JULIE K. EHRHART & BERNICE R. SAN-
DLER, CAMPUS GANG RAPE: PARTY GAMES? (1985)). Warshaw discusses recent alleged
fraternity gang rapes at San Diego State University, University of Florida, University
of Pennsylvania, University of Iowa, University of New Hampshire, Franklin and
Marshall College, and University of Virginia. WARSHAW, supra note 81, at 104-05.
190. In a 1980 letter to the college newspaper, a Colby classmate of mine de-
scribed her perceptions of the effect of fraternity membership:
I lived in Dana my first year . . . . The men there were friendly, as con-
fused as I was, and generally nice to have around .. .they were still fondly
known as "the guys on the T."
That changed. At least for me it did. They all pledged fraternities (yes, I
know, I'm being a trifle blunt) and I won't say that suddenly they were
different, but there was a change, however gradual. There was a definite
sense of the females on one side of a man's existence and "the men" on the
other. ...
The men ran our flooor [sic]. They were blatantly cruel to people they
didn't like, and come 'hell week' they took over the campus, playing capture
the brother, displaying their masculinity all the more vehemently to make
up for their lack of confidence in it, and there was nothing for the women to
do but live with it and try to ignore it. The men all seemed like weak-
kneed, insecure children who desperately needed something to give them an
identity, for finding one inside themselves was beyond their capabilities.
And there were the frats, ready and willing to pamper them, give them a
name, tell them who they liked and disliked, and show them how to be
men, unfortunately with the result that women were seen as tools with
which to display manliness, as less than men, as an afterthought to the
man's world, but not as comrades.
Letter to the editor from Rachel Lavengood, Identity for the Feeble, COLBY EcHo,
Feb. 29, 1980, at 18. "The Guys on the 'T'" responded with a letter that ended with
some of the same harassment that she protested: "Back when we thought you were
our 'friend' you were the 'tits.'" Letter to the editor from "The Guys of the 'T' ",
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gang raping a female student explained that he joined in the assault
because he had come to believe, through fraternity stories and fra-
ternity pornography-viewing activities, that gang rapes were a nor-
mal and acceptable form of sexual expression. 1 '
Anthropologist Peggy Reeves Sanday has analyzed the process by
which some college fraternities socialize new members so that they
believe heterosexual assault is normal, and indeed central, to male
identity, and to disregard women's feelings of harm.
Whatever a young man's subjective or ethical position might be
upon entering college, if he joins a fraternity he may experience
during initiation or in house activities a radical alteration of con-
sciousness that shapes his masculine subjectivity and attitudes to-
ward women. In exchange for brotherhood and power some pledges
are molded by the group mind of the fraternity that casts them in
the role of "rowdy, misogynist male.". . .The misogyny evident in
some fraternity group rituals raises the question of the legal status
of groups of men on campus who train incoming students to de-
mean and disparage their female peers, attitudes that may well
lead to breaking the law in cases of gang rape or date rape."'
In a 1980 discussion of Colby fraternities' effects on women, one
student said:
The individuals (in the fraternities) would probably never behave
that way on their own. . . . [lilt seems to me that being a frat
brother means that you can do violent things, or anti-social things,
like treating women like dirt, and get away with it. Even be en-
couraged to do it.
9 3
Another student, who expressed her fear of the "horror stories" be-
ing told about fraternity parties and her self-consciousness from
"being made to feel like a 'pick-up,'" explained that such behavior
"doesn't necessarily happen only with frat men, but the frat system
seems to legitimize these actions.' '9
4
Runny Noses, COLBY ECHO, Apr. 11, 1980, at 22.
191. WARSHAW, supra note 81, at 109-10. "[Many] fraternities create a sociocul-
tUral context in which the use of coercion in sexual relations with women is normative
and in which the mechanisms to keep this pattern of behavior in check are minimal
at best and absent at worst." Martin & Hummer, supra note 75, at 459. See also
Andrew Merton, On Competition and Class: Return to Brotherhood, Ms Sept. 1985.
at 60.
192. SANDAY, supra note 42, at 192. Sanday suggests that the existence of certain
fraternities can create a situation of sex discrimination in education.
193. Yorks, supra note 75, at 7.
194. Id. This article found that the women interviewed were "reluctant" to dis-
cuss the details of any of the "horror stories" about fraternity treatment of women.
Id.
Another 1980 student commentary that helped spark the debate that eventually led
to Colby's decision to ban fraternities stated:
Inherent in the [fraternity) system is the inferior status of females, who are
viewed as frivolous commodities. As long as this system dominates Colby's
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Two sociologists studying fraternity-related rape concluded that
fraternity violence against women will continue to be a problem
without a fundamental change in the "composition, goals, struc-
tures, and practices" of the groups: "Encouraging renewed emphasis
on their founding values . ., service orientation and activities ...,
or members' moral development. . . will have little effect on frater-
nities' treatment of women. A case for or against fraternities cannot
be made by studying individual members. The fraternity qua group
and organization is at issue."195
According to one study, cultural characteristics of fraternities that
encourage violence against women "are found in fraternity houses
from coast to coast." ' In several cases, universities have found cer-
tain fraternities responsible as groups for organized, intentional, and
persistent patterns of abusive behavior.'9 7 In fact, educational insti-
tutions that do not recognize and take steps to prevent such persis-
tent patterns of abuse by student fraternal organizations may run
the risk of being held liable for resulting harm-regardless of
whether the fraternities characterize themselves as "unofficial" and
"off-campus.",ss
so called "alternative living," social atmosphere, and male-female role, the
male dominant attitude, with all its abuses, will be perpetrated on this cam-
pus, as well as reflected by some of our graduates.
Whit Symmes & Dave Silk, Beyond Fraternities, COLBY EcHo, Feb. 14, 1980, at 22.
195. Martin & Hummer, supra note 75, at 471.
196. WARSHAW, supra note 81, at 106. These cultural characteristics include lan-
guage that dehumanizes women and glorifies sexual assault and rituals that simulate
and reward sexual assault. Id. at 106-09.
By suggesting that these characteristics are not unusual among fraternities, I do
not mean to argue that all fraternities are characterized by violence or harassment or
that all fraternities are a civil rights problem. Yet in supporting and celebrating ex-
clusion of women, exclusively male fraternities that are not explicitly committed to
redressing the problems of male power over women are likely to contribute to the
social marginalization of women. "There are different Klans-just like there's [sic]
different fraternities at a college," insists former Louisiana State Representative (and
presidential candidate) David Duke. NEWSWEEK, Sept. 30, 1990, at 15.
197. WARSHAW, supra note 81, at 106. Although the market is by no means free
from problems of biased perception, it does recognize an economic impact from "mere
association" in the case of college fraternities: "[F]raternities 'are the third riskiest
property to insure behind toxic waste dumps and amusement parks.'" Martin &
Hummer, supra note 75, at 465 (quoting university officials).
198. See Eugene D. Gulland & Marjorie E. Powell, Colleges, Fraternities and So-
rorities: A White Paper on Tort Liability, 17-18, 25-29 (May 1989) (unpublished
manuscript available from American Council on Education). Schools may be liable
under negligence theories for failure to respond adequately to repeated assaults. See,
e.g., Peterson v. San Francisco Comm. Coll. Dist., 685 P.2d 1193 (Cal. 1984).
Students harmed by a school's failure to address problems of persistent sexual har-
assment or sexual assault from fraternities might be successful in winning damages
on the grounds of sex discrimination. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 60
U.S.L.W. 4167 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1992) (Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688, allows a damage remedy for student claiming sexual
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The history and continuing practice of intimidation and hate by
Lambda Chi, combined with a social context that both sanctions
and denies privileged male violence, provides a principled basis for
distinguishing Colby's ban on fraternity membership from a similar
ban on other unofficial student groups-a student social club limited
to lesbians and gay men, for instance, or a group limited to African-
American students.
Civil libertarians are entirely right that such attempts at making
contextual distinctions are dangerous. Members of another "under-
ground" Colby fraternity (which disbanded after pledges were
caught stealing from local townspeople as part of an initiation rit-
ual) turned the comparison on its head to tell a tale of heterosexual
men as primary victims of oppression: "The administration is on a
'witch hunt' one of the students said, at which point another student
chimed in and said 'If we were a bunch of gays [instead of fraternity
members], we could do anything we wanted.' """ It is important
that hurt feelings from loss of privilege, and expression that simply
challenges values and beliefs, be distinguished from fears of harm
based on a social reality and historical context of violent
oppression.2°°
VIII. TRIcKLE-DOWN LIBERTIES
The abuse is permitted, but resisting it is not.
-Catharine A. MacKinnon"'
Civil liberties advocates wisely warn that laws that permit recog-
nition of the harmful impact of certain forms of expression or asso-
ciation will be used to repress legitimate speech by oppressed
groups. The ACLU hopes to guard against the dangers of exagger-
ated perceptions of the harms of subversive speech by sticking
steadfastly to broad, unbendable free speech principles.202 When
harassment).
199. Hokanson, supra note 31, at 14 n.44 (interviewing two male Colby seniors.
former members of Zeta Psi, Apr. 15, 1989).
200. Patricia Williams comments on the tendency for the wounded egos of those
in power to outweigh threats to human lives in her story about city officials who.
when publicly questioned about the police killing of a sixty-seven-year-old black wo.
man during an eviction proceeding, protested that this public attention hurt their
feelings. Patricia J. Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: Tle Discourse of
Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism. 42 U MIA.MIi L REv 127. 135
(1987). "Trying to hold a public official accountable while not hurting his feelings is a
skill the acquisition of which would consume time better spent on almost any con-
ceivable task." Id.
201. MacKinnon, supra note 8, at 12.
202. History demonstrates that if the freedom of speech is weakened for one
person, group, or message, then it is no longer there for others. The free
speech victories that civil libertarians have won in the context of defending
the right to express racist and other anti-civil libertarian messages have
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speech is used by subordinate groups to protest abuses of majority
power, all those lawsuits on behalf of the Nazis and the Klan are
supposed to pay off: the principles established on behalf of oppres-
sors should be there for those whose speech traditionally has been
suppressed." 3
The opposite result is just as likely. This trickle-down theory of
freedom of speech fails to understand that principles are inevitably
shaped by perceptions. The principle of free speech necessarily re-
quires a determination of what constitutes merely "subjectively" of-
fensive speech, and what constitutes "objectively" harmful action.
If the perception of the harm defines the principle, we are left
exposed to the biased perceptions evident in the Colby case and the
Thomas hearings-biases that are likely to define discriminatory ac-
tion as free speech, and to define expressions of resistance as harm-
ful action. The many established exceptions and limits to free
speech frequently are not applied equally. Limitations on speech
that are construed as ambiguous and risky when used to restrict
privileged speech are often accepted as obvious, well-established,
and necessary when used to restrict traditionally suppressed speech.
One month after it decided the fraternity case, Maine's highest
court decided another case about the boundaries of free speech at
Colby College. Lester v. Powers involved a letter written by a former
Colby student in response to a college committee's solicitation of
student comments about a psychology professor then being consid-
ered for tenure."" In this letter, a recent Colby graduate expressed
her opinion that Professor Lewis Lester created a teaching atmo-
sphere that was homophobic, 0 5 and that as a result of his alleged
homophobia she felt uncomfortable and intimidated in his classes. 20 0
When the professor was denied tenure, he sued this former stu-
dent on the ground that she had defamed him by stating that she
been used to protect speech proclaiming anti-racist and pro-civil libertarian
messages.
Strossen, A Modest Proposal?, supra note 71, at 536-37 (footnote omitted).
203. Explaining the ACLU's defense of Nazis and the Klan, General Counsel Na-
dine Strossen states:
In the recent past, the ACLU has handled about six cases a year advocating
the free speech rights of white supremacists, out of a total of more than six
thousand cases, and these white supremacist cases rarely consume signifi-
cant resources. Moreover, the resources the ACLU does expend to protect
hatemongers' first amendment rights are well-invested. They ultimately
preserve not only civil liberties, but also our democratic system, for the
benefit of all.
Id. at 550 (footnotes omitted).
204. 596 A.2d 65, 67 (Me. 1991).
205. Lester v. Powers, No. CV-88-63 (Me. Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., Sept. 25, 1990) at
2, affirmed by Lester v. Powers, 596 A.2d 65 (Me. 1991).
206. Lester v. Powers, 596 A.2d at 67.
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believed he was homophobic. ° In a thoughtful opinion discussing
the free speech problems posed by this claim, Superior Court Justice
Donald Alexander (the same judge who decided Phelps, the frater-
nity case) granted the former student's motion for summary judg-
ment. 08 The Law Court affirmed, reasoning that such comments
were protected by a conditional privilege. 09
The MCLU's interest in students' freedom of speech at Colby
College apparently did not extend to this case: it did not volunteer
to defend the alumna's free speech rights, nor did it take a public
position on the case. Interestingly, the attorney for the plaintiff pro-
fessor in this case was one of the volunteer attorneys bringing the
MCLU suit on behalf of the Lambda Chis' free speech rights. 1 '
Despite assurances that the defense of Colby's banned fraternities
will establish similar rights for banned gay and lesbian groups, a
glance at the news finds civil libertarians on the other side. In a
recent dispute about the right of St. Patrick's Day parade organizers
in New York City to exclude a gay and lesbian group, the New York
Civil Liberties Union argued that the free association right of pri-
vate institutions to exclude those with whom they disagree is funda-
mental to civil liberties.211
Even worse than the uneven defense of free speech rights is the
tendency to condemn efforts to remove traditional barriers to free
speech as an attack on free speech. 2 2 The MCLU defended what
207. Lester v. Powers, No. CV-88-63 (Me. Super. CL. Ken. Cty., Sept. 25, 1990).
The names of students writing to the tenure committee are confidential; this case did
not determine how this particular student's identity was revealed to the plaintilf. See
Lester v. Powers, 596 A.2d at 67 n.2.
208. Lester v. Powers, No. CV-88-63 (Me. Super. CL, Ken. Cty., Sept. 25, 1990).
209. Lester v. Powers, 596 A.2d at 70-72.
210. See id. at 66; Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Phelps v. President & Trustees
of Colby College, 595 A.2d 403 (No. AND-90-511). Of course, since traditional legal
culture encourages attorneys to disregard their personal principles in their profes-
sional work, attorneys should not be presumed to personally support the principles
they argue on behalf of their clients.
211. Civil Liberties Union Supports Hibernians, N Y Tm,as, Mar. 5. 1992 at B3
(late edition).
212. A protest against a film called "Wanda Whips Wall Street," shown at Yale
Law School in 1987, presents one example of how potentially resisting speech is at
risk of being condemned as "threatening action" in the name of a strict defense of
free speech principles. Leaders of the law school women's group responded to com-
plaints about the film by arranging showings of a film about the harms of pornogra-
phy and by organizing a protest. A group of 20 to 30 students, two professors,. and the
law school dean stood silently holding signs saying such things as "Pornography De-
grades Women" near the entrance of the auditorium where the film was shown.
A professor criticized the protest, particularly the dean's involvement, as a threat
to free speech. Letter from a professor to Guido Calebresi. Dean of Yale Law School
(Sept. 24, 1987) (on file with author). He argued that such protests aimed "not only
at rational persuasion but also psychological coercion, and that is especially danger.
ous in a community that wishes to encourage controversy." He warned that the pro-
test might be "frightening and cowing" to other students and would be "likely to
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arguably was Lambda Chi's history of forcing its views on the rest of
the campus as a long tradition of free expression. The MCLU then
denounced Colby's recent attempt to prevent the fraternities' views
from dominating the campus as intolerant coercion and intimidation
of those who are not "politically correct.11
1 3
MacKinnon describes how "pornography's actions are protected
as speech, but our speech against it is silenced as action.1114 Simi-
larly, discussion of the reasons for Colby's ban on fraternities was
sometimes criticized as threatening action, not defended as free
speech. After a public radio station had aired several stories about
the Colby case stressing Colby's threat to fraternity members' free
speech rights, I presented a commentary describing how fraternity
activity had threatened other students' free speech rights.1B
I was at first told by radio officials that, because of their concerns
about libel, I could not speak on the air about specific incidents of
fraternity violence against women unless I had proof that the frater-
nity members involved had been criminally convicted for these inci-
dents.21 This rule effectively barred the content of my speech, since
intimidate others who wish to view the film and arrive at their own judgments."
Despite agreement on principle, perceptions differed sharply about whose speech
posed a danger of becoming intimidating and silencing action. Students participating
in the protest described the harassment and threats they received from a crowd of
hundreds, mostly men, many of whom were drunk. For example, in one incident,
"[alt least eight men came wearing trenchcoats, apparently with nothing on under-
neath, They were greeted with cheers of raucous appreciation. At one point these men
surrounded three women YLS protestors and shouted repeatedly, 'Are you ready?
Are you ready? We're ready! We're ready!'" Protesting students described their
experiences:
Many of us who were there [protesting] felt extremely frightened. Many
were sickened by what we had seen. Between shows some huddled in the
hall and on the stairs, hugging each other. One woman-a former victim of
a sexual attack-cried. Another was sick. The Dean walked around and
talked with us, sometimes saying, "Courage."
An Open Letter for the Law School Community, signed by Eileen Hershenov and 17
other students (Oct. 2, 1987).
213. I believe that a ban on fraternities when I was a Colby student would have
promoted freedom of expression on campus. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 156, at 618-24
(restrictions on pornography may be a defensible means of promoting freedom of
speech within conventional First Amendment doctrine); see generally Owen Fiss,
Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1405 (1986) (restrictions on some
expression can promote freedom of speech).
214. MacKinnon, supra note 8, at 11.
In this system of inequality, a woman's first obligation is silence. Incest and
child sexual abuse is not taboo. Exposing it is. Pornography is not forbid-
den. Saying what it does, is. . . . Because the voice of reality is silent here,
no one knows what is happening to women, and so whenever it happens to
you, it looks exceptional and it feels exceptional.
Id. at 12.
215. I supported my allegations with documentation from college records, but de-
leted references to specific fraternities or individuals.
216. Attempts to report sexual harassment and rape may be deterred by threats
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the point I was trying to make was that certain fraternities generally
were not criminally convicted for abusive actions because they suc-
cessfully used terrorism to thwart reporting.1 7 The radio station fi-
nally aired my commentary, but insisted that I delete references to
the sexual nature of an alleged incident of fraternity misbehavior.
IX. CIVIL RIGHTS: IN WHOSE CONTEXT?
The saga of Colby's Lambda Chis encapsulates a crisis of contem-
porary legal theory. Persistent prejudice and brutal oppression coex-
ist in harmony with noble civil liberties principles. "Neutral" rules
offer little help in resolving inevitable conflicts in perception (like
the Thomas hearings) where what some perceive as preposterous fic-
tion strikes others as obvious truth.
In most public accounts of the Colby case, the harm to others
from "mere membership" in college fraternities was virtually
unimaginable, while the harm to fraternity members from banning
fraternal association was disturbingly clear. I have tried to show how
the opposite can be a plausible view of reality: that significant harm
from participation in some fraternities is a serious possibility and
frequent reality, while the harm to students' expressive freedom
that might result from denying fraternity membership at some pri-
vate colleges is minimal. A credible claim might even have been
made under the Maine Civil Rights Act against certain fraternities
for interference with civil rights by threat, intimidation and
coercion.
In the Colby case, both the MCLU and the Maine court that ruled
against it rejected the consciously contextualized approach to legal
reasoning that has become increasingly familiar in contemporary ju-
risprudence." ' Both feared the results of allowing courts to evaluate
the actual harm to civil rights resulting from private expressions in
particular situations, opting instead for an illusion of unyielding
principles: the MCLU insisting that private association is an indivis-
ible civil right; the courts insisting that courts cannot evaluate con-
flicting private rights-even though they daily do exactly that in vir-
tually every area of the law.
In a postscript on the Colby fraternity case, a new version of the
Maine Civil Rights Act (enacted in 1992) attempts to resolve some
of the problems raised by Phelps. '9 An amendment to the Act ex-
of defamation actions. A study of acquaintance rape describes one woman who was
threatened with a lawsuit after she reported an alleged rape to the police. WARSiAW,
supra note 81, at 91.
217. I contemplated approaching the MCLU for help in bringing a claim of inter-
ference by the public media with my free speech rights.
218. See Symposium, supra note 91.
219. P.L. 1992, ch. 821. This amendment was based on a bill submitted by the
Maine Department of Attorney General.
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plicitly allows claims against private parties (such as hate groups)
for interference with constitutional rights-overturning Phelps's
narrow definition of "rights secured by the constitution. '"220 In addi-
tion, the new version of the Act restricts actionable claims to those
in which the interference with civil rights is accomplished by "physi-
cal force or violence or the threat of physical force or violence."221
The MCLU unsuccessfully lobbied against this limitation as "arbi-
trary and unprincipled.
222
The new limiting language attempts to clarify that the Act aims to
remedy harmful action (physical force, violence, or threats of physi-
cal force or violence), and that it does not intend to restrict other-
wise protected private speech-such as Colby's exercise of its own
right to ban fraternities. This amendment will not absolve courts
from drawing difficult lines nor from choosing among perceptions.
Disagreement may persist about whether Colby's ban on fraternities
is "brute force" or free association, or whether a particular cross
burning is "philosophical disagreement" or a threat of violence. But
a debate about what kinds of expression constitute violent or threat-
ening action, in what circumstances, is likely to be more fruitful
than a debate about defending "absolute" principles of free speech.
Insistence on the inviolability of unadulterated22 3 free speech
rights obscures the fact that any principle is limited, indeed defined,
by its boundaries. The conversation should be about where the
boundaries are, and about whose perceptions and stories shape those
boundaries, rather than about whether there should be any bounda-
ries at all. Denying the inevitable boundaries to expressive rights
privileges the status quo, where the limits generally have been
designed in the interests of those who historically have been most
powerful.
In the current period of anti-civil rights backlash, open debate
about the perceptions that divide free speech from costly action is
particularly urgent. Despite reverence for the principles of Brown v.
220. The new law enacts ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 4684 to read:
For the purposes of this chapter ... rights secured by the Constitution of
the United States and the laws of the United States and by the Constitu-
tion of Maine and the laws of the State include rights that would be pro-
tected from interference by governmental actors regardless of whether the
specific interference complained of is performed or attempted by private
parties.
P.L. 1992, ch. 821, § 3.
221. P.L. 1992, ch. 821, §§ 1 & 2 (to be codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN tit. 5 §§
4681, 4682).
222. Written statement of Sally Sutton, MCLU Executive Director, on L.D. 2318,
submitted to the 115th Maine Legislature's Joint Standing Committee on the Judici-
ary, Mar. 4, 1992.
223. See Berner, supra note 73, at 4. Note that sexual imagery is commonly used
in discussions of free speech principles.
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Board of Education,22" it may be becoming less "odd" for liberals to
use free speech claims to challenge antidiscrimination efforts. For
example, in defending Stroh's Brewing Company's right to express
its views of women through advertising regardless of any discrimina-
tory impact on its workplace, the ACLU's Executive Director
presumes without discussion that his distinction between speech
and conduct is the right one.22
Legal analysis that promotes stories of pure principles separate
from personal and political contexts serves to legitimize, not chal-
lenge, the dominant context of pervasive denial of oppression. In
contrast, feminist method demands personal responsibility for prin-
cipled positions, opening up legal reasoning to scrutiny of personal
emotional commitments. And rather than replacing rational princi-
ples with personal whims, feminist method can serve to foster rigor-
ous analysis of the socially constructed presumptions that shape in-
dividual perceptions.
Attempts to proclaim neutral principles beyond debate (or to ab-
stain from realism in postmodern debate) will not prevent personal
experiences from masquerading as universal reality. The concepts of
"free speech" and "harmful conduct" and even "violence" are to
some extent malleable, subjective, and indeterminate. But those who
use law in the intractably real world in the hope of making both
better should struggle to debate-and redefine-these complicated
and dangerous categories, and not avoid their difficulties.
224. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
225. "The reason we make a distinction in this country between speech and con-
duct is so we can avoid a situation where the government gets the power to decide
which speech is acceptable, while still retaining that power to punish illegal conduct.
That is the right distinction." Letter from Ira Glasser. ACLU Executive Director.
Censorship and Advertising, Los ANGELES TIMES. Dec. 11, 1991. at 6B (arguing that
ads are unregulatable speech, not discriminatory conduct). I assume that Glasser
would place "whites only" employment advertising on the side of conduct, not
speech, but I'm not as confident as he is about the government's line-draing
abilities.
In another example, the Florida branch of the American Civil Liberties Union is
using free speech grounds to appeal Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp.
1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991), which found that pervasive pornography in the workplace con-
tributed to an environment of sexual harassment. Suzanne Fields, Ongoing Gender
Furies, WASHINGTON TIMES, Nov. 18, 1991, at E3.
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